Türkçe TercümeWe have previously discussed some of the activities of Bekir Sami Bey, one of the most prominent figures of the North Caucasian political emigration, during World War I and as the first foreign minister of the Angora government, regarding the struggle for liberation and independence of the Caucasus. (see. https://www.historycaucasus.com/blog/in-commemoration-of-the-92nd-anniversary-of-the-death-of-bekir-sami-kundukh)
Bekir Sami Kundukh's negotiations with the Allies, which started in February 1921 during the London Conference, resulted in three separate agreements duly signed with Britain, France, and Italy in mid-March. The Allies, who had been ready to compromise on the Treaty of Sèvres, now sought to end the war. Bekir Sami Bey, fully aware that the liberation of the Caucasus depended on Turkey making peace with the Allies, sought to benefit from this opportunity and reach a swift agreement to save Turkey from Allied occupation and its dependence on Soviet aid. Bekir Sami Bey, appointed by the Angora Government with extraordinary authority and sent to the London Conference, took swift and radical steps towards this absolute goal and drafted agreements. Above all, Bekir Sami Bey demonstrated on the diplomatic level that the Angora Government was the victor of the Anatolian Civil War and, overruling the representatives of the Istanbul Government in London, became the sole interlocutor for the Allies. According to the agreement drafted with the British, British prisoners of war held by the Turks (including General Charles Townshend) would be released, while the British would release all Turkish prisoners held in Malta, including 145 Turkish statesmen, soldiers, administrators, and intellectuals. Furthermore, Britain had offered to mediate between Ankara and Greece to end the Greco-Turkish War. Under this agreement, Britain would be granted certain economic privileges.
Mustafa Kemal Pasha was certainly aware that this success would boost Bekir Sami Bey's political career. He knew that during the time he spent in Europe, Bekir Sami Bey had established extensive connections with European politicians and statesmen who were concerned about the prosperous future of his homeland, the Caucasus. However, he worried that this could disrupt the delicate balance of relations with the Soviets at any moment. Due to his political rivalry with some other representatives of the North Caucasian emigration in Anatolia, he took an extremely cold attitude toward the Caucasian question. He had long accepted the idea of abandoning the Caucasus to the Russian Bolsheviks.
Allowing Bekir Sami Bey to enjoy the benefits of this success, however, was out of the question either. While Greek armies were rapidly advancing into Anatolia, Bekir Sami Bey was vying for victory on the Angora Government's behalf in London and Paris. In the meantime, Mustafa Kemal Pasha was spending intense efforts in Ankara to discredit his achievements in the eyes of the nation and the deputies of the Grand Assembly. Rather than follow the path blazed by Bekir Sami Bey at the conference and further pressuring the Allies to negotiate, Mustafa Kemal Pasha chose to declare Bekir Sami Bey a failure, despite all his medium- and long-term gains at the conference. He dismissed Bekir Sami Bey from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, first verbally on May 1, 1921, and then officially on May 8. Addressing the 32nd session of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on May 12, Mustafa Kemal Pasha portrayed the results achieved by Bekir Sami Bey in London as a violation of Turkish sovereignty. As if he were not the one who dismissed him just a few days earlier, he demanded that Bekir Sami Bey resign from his post as Minister of Foreign Affairs in front of the deputies. Lacking the ability to assess the situation properly, the deputies unanimously cried "agree" and accepted Bekir Sami Bey's resignation. Ismet (İnönü) Bey was credited with a battle known in Turkish historiography as the Second Battle of İnönü, a battle in which the British, French, and Italian armies did not intervene, thanks to Bekir Sami Bey's diplomatic success. Thus, Mustafa Kemal Pasha secured sole access to the benefits of the peace that would soon be achieved with the Allies.
However, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, acutely aware of Bekir Sami Bey's diplomatic and representational skills, while putting pressure on him to resign, at the end of his speech that same day, said, "I have one more request. I have also spoken with His Excellency the Pasha, the Head of the Deputy Committee, regarding the significant benefits that will be derived from Bekir Sami Bey in Europe. Therefore, we are considering entrusting him with a duty to the country. If approved, I will request that he be considered a graduate. I hope he will perform very useful services. As you know, they have been instrumental in important projects in London, Paris, and Italy. Consequently, the Europeans and the Allied Powers are showing an inclination towards us. He will travel to Europe to increase their inclination." (see. TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları, Vol. 2, TBMM, 12 May 1921 32nd session minutes, Ankara, 1985, p.72-3) This clearly indicated that he would continue to utilize Bekir Sami Bey's talents for his own political career.
Indeed, that's what happened. Bekir Sami Bey, unconcerned with personal career ambitions, accepted this opportunity to play an active role in resolving the problems of the Caucasus and traveled to Paris in July. Meeting with French Prime Minister Aristide Briand on July 27, Bekir Sami Bey attended a meeting with representatives of the Caucasian republics the following day.
The statements reflected in the minutes of the meeting of the North Caucasus representative delegation held in Paris on July 28, chaired by Abdülmecid Chermoy and secretarial by Ibrahim Khan Ibrahimbek, were as follows: (see. The original meeting minutes)
Mr. Chermoeff reported on Bekir Sami Bey's meeting with Mr. Briand. The conversation also seriously affected the Caucasian Confederation in relation to the Turkish question. Mr. Briand promised to discuss the recognition of the Confederation's rights and to raise this issue at the Supreme Council meetings.
Bekir Sami Bey told Mr. Briand that if peace were reached, the Angora Government would have to break with the Bolsheviks, and then it would be necessary to determine who would be able to provide Turkey with the material aid it currently receives from the Bolsheviks.
The conversation showed that France, for formal reasons, could not come to Turkey's aid, but that France should have maintained relations with Turkey through the Caucasus.
Mr. Chermoeff spoke to Bekir Sami Bey about the lack of certainty in his reception of the representatives of the Caucasian Confederation and the latter's desire to more precisely establish their relations with the representative of the Angora Government. In the second part of the conversation, Bekir Sami Bey stated that the Government of Angora does not make any claims to Caucasian territory and that the question of Turkish Armenia would be the subject of a special agreement between the representatives of the Caucasian Confederation and the Government of Turkey.
Mr. Khatissian spoke about the meeting with Mr. Iodko.
Bekir Sami Bey: Yesterday, I spoke to Mr. Briand. First, about the situation in Turkey, and then, naturally, about the Caucasus. I found in Mr. Briand a great supporter of the question of the Caucasian Confederation.
According to Mr. Briand, France finds the formation of the Caucasian Confederation indispensable, not only for peace in the Middle East, but also because it is a universal issue. Bekir Sami Bey told Mr. Briand that under all conditions, however the Eastern Question is resolved, the Turks will prefer and be happy to have the Caucasian Confederation as neighbors rather than Russia, because the Caucasian states have much in common with Turkey and there is room for good neighborly relations.
Bekir Sami Bey promises the Assembly to defend the question of the Caucasian Confederation personally or through his envoys before his Parliament or government.
There is currently no possibility of defining the boundaries of the Caucasus. He is not referring to each member of the Confederation, but to the entire Caucasus in general. Later, when the country is rid of the Bolsheviks, a congress of representatives of all the Caucasian states and Turkey can be organized.
Turkey is currently in a period of revolution, and the Caucasian states are enslaved. But when the peoples of the Caucasus are masters of the situation at home and peace is restored, both sides will be able to achieve a modus vivendi for the common good.
This is all Bekir Sami Bey can say from Turkey's perspective.
Mr. Briand promised to place the issue of recognition of the North Caucasian Republic on the agenda of the Council of Ministers on July 28 of this year, and the issue of recognition of the Caucasian Confederation on the agenda of the Supreme Council session.
Mr. Chermoeff believes that before discussing details, we must have accomplished facts before us: peace between France and Turkey, recognition of the Caucasian Confederation by the Great Powers, and then our return to the Caucasus. This will bring the peoples of the Caucasus closer to the question of the bases, to insist on the fulfillment of our demands, and until then, we must leave the details aside.
Mr. Khatissian: The idea that Turkey must support the Caucasus is a long-standing principle. This is understandable; for Turkey, a state that separates it from Russia is a more agreeable neighbor. The Armenians also held this view, but here, two issues are intertwined:
For the Armenians, the question cannot be posed as it was in the Assembly. For the Armenians, the question of detail is vital. Frankly speaking, for Azerbaijan, the North Caucasus, and Georgia, this is a general question of the Caucasus, but for Armenia, it takes on a completely different scale.
According to the news received by the Delegation, the Armenian press and public opinion, for example in Constantinople, after receiving the news of the signing of the declaration accusing Mr. Aharonian and Mr. Khatissian of treason, claim that they have sold out the interests of the Armenian Republic to its Caucasian neighbors and that the interests of Turkish Armenia are being promoted for Caucasian Armenia, and that the question should have been studied exclusively from the point of view of a unified Armenia.
The Armenians, through their year-long struggle against the Bolsheviks, have demonstrated that the idea of independence has firmly entered the minds of the popular masses; only three or four days ago, the Armenians lost the last vestiges of their independence, and their government was transferred to Tabriz.
The Armenians have recently lost 1,200,000 men, which is a third of the entire population. But for freedom and independence, these sacrifices are necessary. And the Armenian people say they are ready to endure new sacrifices, but only in the name of a unified Armenia.
It is clear to everyone that France wants to support the Caucasian Confederation not only for the sake of Turkey, but perhaps for other reasons as well. However, as for Armenian psychology, we may agree with Turkey, but we must prepare the ground among the people to make them fight the Russians.
The border issue with Turkey is not a detail; it is a vital issue.
Second question. The declaration states that before reaching a complete agreement, the border issue must be resolved. It should be noted that the Armenians, upon joining this Confederation, made some proposals discussed in paragraph 7. And from Confederation to life, one more step must be taken.
And to move in this direction, Turkey must do its part. There is a community of ideas, there is a desire to work together; this union must also be capable of survival.
Mr. Khatissian ended his speech by thanking Bekir Sami Bey for having defended Armenian interests before Mr. Briand. He found it to be a very good step, but a second step forward must still be taken.
Bekir Sami Bey insisted that the Caucasian Confederation be strengthened by its recognition by the Great Powers; in this, he did not doubt the sympathies of America and Italy, and with peace in Turkey, we could then move on to resolving the details.
Mr. Tchenkeli: This moment is very important for the Caucasus; we are currently examining the question of Confederation. Bekir Sami Bey has rendered services on this point, and we must be grateful to him. Everyone understands that Turkey will not support the Caucasus unless it is fully convinced that France is interested in the Caucasus. And the representatives of the peoples of the Caucasus can now begin discussing the issue with the representatives of the Angpra Government.
It seems possible to outline the conditions under which an agreement can be reached.
The issue raised by Mr. Khatissian is not simply an Armenian one; it concerns the entire Caucasus. It would be a crime not to take advantage of this situation to interest the Great Powers.
Mr. Khatissian: It goes without saying that in his statements, he did not want to weaken our union.
Bekir Sami Bey explains his statements and concludes by saying that the only power that can support the Caucasian Confederation is Turkey, because neither France, nor England, nor any other Power will contribute a single soldier. He requests that he be allowed to inform the head of the French government that the representatives of the Caucasian Confederation and the Angora government have joined forces and are ready to rid their territory of the Bolsheviks, armed. Only then will Turkey and the Caucasus be able to count on France's support.
Mr. Chermoeff recalls how the visit of the representatives of the Caucasian republics to Mr. Briand went.
When Mr. Khatissian speaks of public opinion in Armenia, Bekir Sami Bey must also consider public opinion in Turkey when he speaks of settling the border issue between Turkey and Armenia. If the conversation deals with the borders between the Caucasian Confederation and Turkey, this should produce a favorable impression and exert some pressure on public opinion in Turkey in favor of the Caucasian Confederation.
Bekir Sami Bey: Declares that he is invited today to dine with the most eminent politicians in France, the matter will obviously be addressed, and he would like to be able to defend the common cause with a clear conscience when leaving this Assembly.
Mr. Tchenkeli: Commenting on what has been said previously, he finds that there is no significant difference in principle, only misunderstandings that cannot prevent those present from granting Bekir Sami-bey's request.
This proposal is unanimously accepted.
Bekir Sami Bey leaves the meeting at 7:00 a.m., and the session continues.
It is decided to meet on Friday, July 29, at 3:45 a.m. at the headquarters of the Armenian Delegation to go together to the German Ambassador's office.
Mr. Tchenkeli says he has seen the new United States Ambassador, stating that he is leaving for the countryside. He has requested that a separate statement be sent to him, unless it is reserved for a joint visit. He requests that both be delayed until his return to Paris.
It is decided to send the Ambassador a statement on behalf of the Georgian Embassy with a letter, signed by all, planning a visit to the Ambassador after his return to Paris.
Mr. Toptchibacheff spoke about the assassination of Mr. Djevanchir and the grandiose pan-Islamist protest demonstration in Constantinople; he feared that this murder would harm the fate of the Caucasian Confederation and the relationship of Muslim peoples with it.
Mr. Khatissian said that upon reading this news, he and Mr. Aharonian also thought about it.
Mr. Khatissian proposed not attributing this event to nationalist motives, in support of which he cited two attempts on the lives of Armenian politicians by Armenians, one resulting in death, the other against the President of the Armenian Delegation in Paris, Mr. Aharonian. Mr. Khatissian notes that, unfortunately, groups have formed among the Armenian people whose goal is terrorist attacks against Armenian statesmen and those of other nationalities and emphasizes that such attacks cast a shadow and inspire hatred against different parties.
This mentality must be rooted out from the psychology of the masses, especially such elements, and joint efforts must be made to achieve this goal.
The Armenian Delegation in Paris strongly condemns this attack.
Further discussion of this topic is postponed to the next meeting, which is scheduled for Sunday, July 31, at 4:00 a.m. at the Georgian Embassy.
The meeting adjourned at 7:45 a.m.
The minutes of the meeting revealed that an agreement had been reached with the Allies regarding Turkey's cooperation, essential for the liberation of the Caucasus from the Bolshevik Russian occupation, and that Bekir Sami Bey still retained his influence over the Angora government. However, the uncompromising stance of the Armenian side made the ideal of a Caucasian Confederation dependent on the Armenian-Turkish conflict, and once again, a historic opportunity was to be missed. So, all Bekir Sami Bey's efforts were in vain.
Bekir Sami Bey, who could not be executed due to a lack of evidence in the Izmir Plot, received a final onslaught in another political conspiracy in Mustafa Kemal Pasha's famous speech delivered during the second congress of the Republican People's Party between October 15 and 20, 1927. Attacking Bekir Sami Bey, Mustafa Kemal Pasha decided to play the London Conference card once more and seized the opportunity to destroy his rival's reputation completely. In the Speech, in which political rivals, almost half of whom were North Caucasian immigrants, were discredited, figures such as Rauf (Orbay) Bey, (The Circassian) Ethem and his brothers, Anzavur, Salih Karzeg Pasha, and Yusuf İzzet Pasha also received their shares: (see. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, A Speech, Ankara, 1981, s.496-501)
Our delegation, which had gone to London, returned to Ankara after the second victory of İnönü. You are aware that the Conference had not led to any result. Bekir Sami Bey, Foreign Minister, who had been at the head of the delegation, had, however, entered on his own account into connection and discussion with the statesmen of England, France, and Italy and had signed some special agreements with each of them.
According to one of the agreements between Bekir Sami Bey and England, we were to release all the English prisoners of war who were in our hands. England, in exchange, was to return ours, except for those of the Turkish prisoners who it was alleged had brutally or badly treated English prisoners or Armenians. Our government could naturally neither approve nor ratify such an agreement because this would have meant recognizing a kind of right of jurisdiction on the part of a foreign Government over the acts of a Turkish subject in the interior of Turkey itself. As, however, the English released some of the prisoners, although we had not ratified the agreement, we, on our part, released some of the English prisoners. Later, following an arrangement which took place on the 23rd of October 1921, between Hamit Bey, Vice-president of the Red Crescent, and the English Commissioner at Istanbul, the exchange of all the Turkish prisoners at Malta and all the English prisoners in Turkey was decided upon, a decision which was duly carried out. It appears that Bekir Sami Bey, besides his official negotiations and discussions, had had an · interviiew of a strictly private nature with Lloyd George… The actual words that passed between them had been taken down in shorthand… A protocol had been signed . . . I do not remember that I had been informed of the contents of the copy which was in the possession of Bekir Sami Bey. Although I have recently asked him through the intermediary of the Foreign Office for a copy of it, Bekir Sami Bey Bey informed the Minister by letter that translations of this copy had been put before me at that time and that the original as well as the translations had remained among the documents to which they belonged when he left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This document, however, could not be found among the others. Nobody in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs knows anything about it or what it contains. As far as I am concerned, I do not remember ever having been informed of the existence of this document.
Another agreement was also signed on the 11th of March 1921, between Bekir Sami Bey and Mr Briand, President of the French Council of Ministers. According to this agreement, the hostilities between France and the National Government were at an end ... The French were to disarm the bands, and we, on our part, the armed volunteers. . . French officers were to be employed in our gendarmerie. The gendarmerie organized by the French was to be retained... The French were to have the preference in enterprises for the economic development of the districts evacuated by France, as well as the provinces of Mamuretulaziz, Diyarbakir, and Sivas, and, in addition, were to be granted mining concessions in Ergani, etc...
I do not consider it necessary for me to refer to the reasons that led our government to also reject this agreement.
Last of all, Bekir Sami Bey had signed another agreement with Count Sforza, the Italian Foreign Minister, on the 12th March 1921. According to it, Italy undertook to support our claims at the Conference for the restitution of Trakya and Izmir, in exchange for which we were to cede to them a prior right: for economic enterprises in the Sancaks of Antalya, Burdur, Mugla, Isparta, and in parts of the Sancaks of Afyonkarahisar, Kütahya, Aydm, and Konya, which were to be specified at a later date.
In this agreement, it was also agreed to cede to Italian capitalists all those economic enterprises which would not he carried out by the Turkish Government or by Turkish capital and to transfer the mines of Eregli to a Turkish-Italian company.
Naturally, this agreement could only have the fate of being rejected by our government.
It is perfectly evident that the terms of these agreements which the Entente Powers had induced Bekir Sami Bey, the leader of the delegation which we had sent to Europe to conclude Peace, to sign, had no other aim than to cause our national Government to accept the Treaty which the same, Powers had concluded among themselves, under the name of the “Tripartite Agreement", after the Sevres plan, and which divided Anadolu into three spheres of interest. The statesmen of the Entente had also succeeded in inducing Bekir Sami Bey to accept these plans. As you can see, Bekir Sami Bey was taken up in London more with these three individual agreements than with the discussions at the Conference. The contradiction between the principles of the National Government and the system followed by the personage who was Foreign Minister can unfortunately not be explained.
I must admit that when Bekir Sami Bey returned to Ankara with these agreements, I was very astonished, and my attention was aroused. He expressed his conviction that the contents of the agreements he had signed were in accord with the higher interests of the country and maintained that he was able to support this conviction and defend and prove it before the Assembly. But there is no doubt that his opinion was wrong and his ideas illogical. It was certain not only that they could not be approved of by the Assembly but also that he would be overthrown as Minister of Foreign Affairs. As, however, under the conditions prevailing at this time, I did not believe it necessary to involve the Assembly in long discussions and dissertations on political questions, I pointed out his error to Bekir Sami Bey personally and proposed that he should resign his office as Foreign Minister. Bekir Sami Bey consented to my proposal and resigned.
Nevertheless, influenced by the impression which the different conversations he had had during his journey in Europe as leader of the delegation had made on him, Bekir Sami Bey was persistent in his conviction that it was possible to come to an understanding with the Entente Powers within the scope of our principles. He maintained that it would be a good thing to arrive at such an understanding. This induced me to write him the following private letter:
19th May 1921.
To Bekir Sami Bey, Deputy for Amasya.
You are aware of the principles which the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey has hitherto proclaimed to the world on different occasions and in different ways. The main lines of these principles can be summarized in the following short phrase:
"Security of the integrity of our country and of the absolute independence of our nation within the recognized national frontiers." It is conceivable that after the impressions you have gained and the relations you have had on the recent journey you have made as leader of our delegation, you have arrived at the conviction that the Entente Powers are inclined to come to an understanding with our country without injuring our principles. Up to the present moment, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey cannot perceive any serious and sincere acts and results which could confirm such an inclination on the part of the Entente. If you think that you can render the realization of your supposition concerning this feasible, I assure you that the Grand National Assembly and its Government would willingly agree.
Mustafa Kemal
Subsequently, Bekir Sami Bey made a second journey to Europe, but this also had no good result.
However, the Government considered it necessary, after it had been discovered that the negotiations carried on with M. Franklin Bouillon at Ankara had been complicated by certain steps that Bekir Sami Bey had taken in Paris, to make known through their agency that Bekir Sami Bey had not been entrusted with any official mission.
During his second visit to Europe, Bekir Sami Bey also sent me some communications, and after his return, he sent a report to me. Certain considerations contained in these communications and in his report were unfortunately not calculated to remove all doubt and hesitation on the question as to whether Bekir Sami Bey had completely grasped the ideal of· the Turkish nation we were striving to reach and whether he had acted in the spirit of this ideal.
Bekir Sami Bey expressed his opinion in conformity with the influences and opinions that had affected him in Europe. After having criticised our policy, he said in a telegram in cipher on the 12th of August: "While the opportunity is still given to us, prudent policy might save the country from the abyss into which it has fallen. Studying events carefully, an attitude must be assumed that is necessitated by the anxiety for the salvation of our country. If this is not done, none of us will be able to withdraw from the responsibility imposed upon us before history and the nation. I beg you in the name of the prosperity of our nation and of the salvation of Islam to adopt a fitting attitude and to tell me immediately that you have done so."
Bekir Sami Bey became an adherent of peace at any price.
In his report on the 24th of December 1921, he explained his point of view on this question in these words:
“I firmly believe that the continuation of war will destroy and annihilate our country to such a degree that its existence as well as that of the nation will be jeopardized and that the sacrifices which have been borne will have been in vain. I am firmly convinced that by continuing of war, we are working for our internal and external enemies and thereby ourselves, pushing the nation into the misfortune and misery which we are dreading. The duty imposed upon Your Excellency is such a heavy burden as has scarcely ever been borne by any statesman. You have taken upon yourself a task of such magnitude as has seldom fallen upon a man in the course of the history of - I will not say five or six but, perhaps, ten or fifteen centuries. Your Excellency can win an immortal name in history and become the reviver of Islam if, together with the future of the Turkish race, the future of the whole of the Mohammedan world will be secured without falling from one extreme to the other and without sacrificing the true interests of the future to the advantages of the present moment, and if the national and Mohammedan aim, which can be realized even to a greater extent than we desire at the price of a preliminary sacrifice, will be secured and strengthened. Otherwise, there is no doubt that the Turkish nation, and with it the entire Mohammedan world, will be condemned to slavery and humiliation. I consider that it is a sacred duty imposed upon me by my patriotism and adherence to Islam to beg Your Excellency not to let pass the opportunity and the glory of leaving to all Mohammedan generations to come, until the last Judgment Day, a memory and a name which only stand second to that of our Prophet.”
In short, it means this. In all his suggestions, he advised us to put an end to the national fight to escape from slavery and humiliation on the lines of the agreements which he himself had concluded in London.
These considerations of Bekir Sami Bey's had made no actual positive impression on me. The ideas he developed, and his manner of thinking, had brought me to the conviction that there would be no advantage or object to be gained by discussing or arguing with him.
Cem Kumuk
Istanbul, 17 September 2025