TürkçeWithin the framework of the 30-volume book series project titled "Europe and Circassia: 1760-1870," spearheaded by Azamat Kumykov in collaboration with the German academic publisher De Gruyter, the first volume of the series, entitled " Diplomatic Dispatches about Circassia from the Consulate of France in Odessa, 1836–1840," was published in 2024. The book was translated into Turkish by Erdogan Boz and published in Turkey by the publisher Koyu Siyah in the same year. Georgian scholar Georgi Mamoulia and Sophie Daniel also provided editorial contributions to this volume. The first volume, consisting of 260 pages, contains transcriptions of the original French texts of 36 different correspondences by Charles-Alexandre de Challaye, the French Consul in Odessa, along with their English and Russian translations.
Today, we will examine the first published volume of the project: "Diplomatic Dispatches about Circassia from the Consulate of France in Odessa, 1836–1840."
Narrative Content and Historical ScopeThe correspondence primarily chronicles the protracted Russian military campaign aimed at subjugating the Caucasian Mountaineers, focusing on the establishment of coastal fortifications from Anapa to Mingrelia. The letters emphasize the heavy casualties sustained by Russian forces, driven not only by Circassian guerrilla tactics but predominantly by disease, inadequate provisions, and harsh environmental conditions. The narrative documents significant local victories, such as the coordinated capture of the Tuapse, Psezuape, and St. Nicholas fortresses by mobilized Circassian forces utilizing captured Russian artillery. The text offers intriguing insights into the presence of British agents actively working to unite the Circassian tribes, supply them with munitions, and breach the Russian naval blockade.
Charles-Alexandre de Challaye's writing embodies the cautious and observant style typical of 19th-century diplomatic reporting. Acknowledging his reliance on military rumors, merchant accounts, and delayed reports due to Russian operational secrecy and the physical isolation of the theater of war, the Consul frequently adds caveats to his intelligence. Although he occasionally exhibits sympathy for the outgunned Circassians, he maintains a detached tone, focusing on how these remote conflicts influenced broader European power dynamics, particularly concerning the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain. Challaye consistently cross-references official Russian troop estimates and casualty reports with his independently gathered intelligence, frequently exposing a pattern of state exaggeration.
Semantic Quality and Editorial TranslationThe semantic structure of the translated text effectively preserves the formal phrasing of early 19th-century French diplomacy. Modern editorial intervention greatly enhances the primary source's semantic clarity by integrating comprehensive historical footnotes that identify specific military commanders, indigenous tribal names, and precise dates of battles vaguely mentioned in the original correspondence. By retaining archaic measurements like the myriameter or pood, alongside region-specific historical terminology, the documents safeguard the historical authenticity of the primary source material.
Ultimately, the collection serves as a critical, primary mirror reflecting the logistical and environmental failures of Russian imperial expansion in the Caucasus against the resilience of local alliances. The correspondence reveals that Russian military efforts in the Caucasus were severely hampered by a combination of harsh environmental conditions and systemic logistical mismanagement:
— Lethal Encampments: Coastal fortresses were exceptionally detrimental to health, with diseases claiming the lives of a third of the soldiers deployed there annually.
— Chronic Malnutrition: Troops suffered from a severe shortage of provisions, and the meager food available was barely sustaining, described as being of "disgusting quality."
— Rapid Decimation: This deprivation left soldiers highly vulnerable to disease; in one instance, an expeditionary force of 14,000 men that landed in May was almost entirely decimated by illness within merely four months.
— Mass Casualties: In Russian fortresses, it was common for 1,000 to 1,200 men to be buried at a single location over the course of one summer. Hospital populations swelled drastically; in Kaffa (Feodosia) alone, 2,500 sick soldiers were recorded by the end of July.
Precarious Supply Lines and Naval VulnerabilityThe Russian army could not rely on local resources and was compelled to import camp supplies, munitions, and all provisions entirely by sea from Russia. These maritime supply lines were highly vulnerable to severe weather conditions, as demonstrated by a devastating storm in June 1838 that sank multiple warships (including the steamer Jason) and 14 chartered merchant vessels, severely compromising the logistical lifeline of the coastal troops. Widespread famine in the Russian interior further strained these vulnerable supply chains, driving up grain prices and complicating the feeding of the massive Caucasian army.
Harsh Terrain and Flawed Fortification StrategyThe Caucasian geography dictated a deadly form of warfare, forcing Russian expeditionary columns to march through dense forests, deep ravines, and easily defensible narrow mountain passes where Circassian fighters inflicted heavy casualties. To secure access to freshwater, Russian engineers constructed coastal fortresses in low-lying areas. This strategic blunder left the garrisons highly vulnerable, as Circassian forces—sometimes aided by Polish deserters—positioned artillery on the surrounding commanding heights to destroy the defenses. Severe winter conditions periodically froze the ports and stranded weakened garrisons in hostile territory, halting all military and logistical operations for months.
Employing the rugged terrain as a weapon, the Circassians effectively neutralized the Russians' numerical and technological superiority. They strictly avoided pitched mass battles, opting instead for a localized war of attrition that exploited the invading forces' geographical vulnerabilities. The Mountaineers utilized dense forests, steep mountains, and narrow valleys to trap and annihilate Russian columns. This environment was so perilous that Russian commanders deliberately postponed inland expeditions until autumn, hoping that the fallen leaves would reduce the risk of sudden forest ambushes. Rather than congregating in large, static masses, Circassian fighters dispersed to attack isolated detachments and lightly defended targets. For instance, a swift night raid by 600 men easily overwhelmed the small guard unit in Kislovodsk, demonstrating their capacity for rapid and unexpected strikes. Recognizing the logistical difficulties Russians faced in building coastal forts in low-lying areas near freshwater, the Circassians seized control of the surrounding highlands. From these vantage points, they kept the garrisons under constant threat, picking off even those soldiers attempting to distribute supplies within the fortress walls.
During the brutal summer months, the tribes frequently paused direct assaults, content to wait as heat, malnutrition, and rampant disease decimated the Russian ranks. By maintaining close observation from the mountains, they employed the environmental factor as a passive weapon. While earlier engagements relied on fierce close-quarters combat—such as breaking disciplined Russian infantry squares armed solely with daggers—the Circassians rapidly adapted to the new paradigm. Assisted by Polish deserters, they deployed captured Russian cannons onto mountain peaks to bombard the fortresses, ultimately executing sophisticated sieges that culminated in forceful ultimatums.
The Circassians actively avoided mass troop formations, choosing instead to scatter their forces in all directions to strike vulnerable Russian detachments. This fluid approach allowed them to dictate the rules of engagement across the Caucasian theater of war.
Circassian fighters never presented themselves in large groups that would make easy targets for Russian field artillery. When Russian forces concentrated and were supported by naval artillery (e.g., during the amphibious landing at Tuapse), the Mountaineers withdrew to the highlands rather than engaging in a futile and static defense, leaving behind only a few scattered marksmen to harass the invaders. They could swiftly descend upon vulnerable Russian troops marching in fragmented groups. During inland expeditions, they were highly successful in catching the Apsheronsky and Navaginsky regiments off guard, nearly annihilating them. In another instance, they ambushed a 1,500-strong Russian corps commanded by General Zass in open terrain, capturing their artillery and forcing them to retreat across the Kuban River. This decentralized structure enabled lightning-fast, intelligence-driven attacks on poorly protected outposts. Because they struck rapidly and vanished into inaccessible terrain, the exact mechanisms of these surprise attacks remained a mystery to the Russian high command. Following the fall of the Tuapse fortress, Russian authorities could glean no details on how the attack was executed, as the entire 400-man garrison had been swiftly put to the sword or taken hostage.
The Circassian fighters' ability to deliver devastating blows and subsequently vanish into the mountains instilled profound fear and demoralization within the Russian ranks. By silently surveilling Russian fortresses from surrounding hills just outside artillery range, the Circassians served as a constant, impending threat. This invisible pressure meant that even routine duties, such as a quartermaster distributing supplies within fortress walls, carried the sudden risk of assassination by a mountain sniper. When the Circassians successfully assaulted a fortress, they typically left almost no survivors, putting the garrison to the sword or dragging captives deep into the impenetrable mountains. This phantom-like vanishing act left the Russian command entirely blind to how the surprise attacks were executed, deepening the mystery and terror surrounding the Mountaineers' tactics. The perpetual threat of sudden ambushes instilled a "profound disgust" in Russian troops faced with the prospect of being confined to isolated wooden towers or coastal blockhouses. A fierce hatred for a war that offered them nothing but deprivation, disease, enslavement, or death developed among the soldiers. Despite their standard discipline and "blind obedience," Russian soldiers were acutely aware of the brutal and lethal reality of the Caucasian campaign. The bitter reality that massive numbers of men were sent into the mountains with only a fraction returning created widespread discouragement and despair among the occupying forces. The psychological toll of fighting an enemy that could materialize from the forest, inflict catastrophic losses, and melt back into the mist was as debilitating as the physical casualties. This state of constant siege paranoia ultimately compelled the Russian army to completely rethink its strategy of isolated coastal occupation.
British Agents and Geopolitical ManeuveringBritish agents arrived in Circassia with the aim of transforming local tribal resistance into a unified, geopolitically significant front against Russian expansionism. The British officer John Stewart traveled throughout Circassia for eight months, accompanied by a retinue of tribal chiefs and thousands of armed natives. His mission was to convince the historically isolated Caucasian nations that their survival depended on confederation and the establishment of a central government to coordinate a unified resistance.
The agents sought to provoke British state intervention by deliberately defying the Russian naval blockade. James Bell, the owner of the Vixen, intentionally unloaded military supplies in plain sight of the Russian cruiser squadron near Sudzhuk-Kale. Claiming that British officials, including Lord Palmerston, tacitly endorsed this expedition, Bell escalated a smuggling venture into a major diplomatic crisis. To maintain the flow of weaponry, British agents organized regular logistical lines from the Ottoman Empire. Utilizing fast, light boats departing from Samsun at night, Bell established a consistent supply route under the protection of the local Pasha, secretly transporting military munitions—including small cannons—and commercial goods. British adventurers actively inflated their official status to boost Circassian morale and ensure their own safety. An Englishman named Knight (referred to as Leart or Neat) was introduced to the native tribes as an official ambassador dispatched by the British government. Although this deception prevented the natives from treating him as a spy, Challaye warned that it risked precipitating a massive collapse in morale once the Circassians realized the promised British military intervention was entirely illusory.
The Russian Response: Blockades and Scorched EarthThe Russian Empire responded to British and foreign interference not merely through diplomacy, but by escalating naval blockades and launching massive military campaigns predicated on scorched-earth tactics. Russian cruisers actively patrolled the coastline from the Kuban to Mingrelia, specifically to intercept smuggled munitions. This culminated in the Russian military brig Ajax capturing the British vessel Vixen near Sudzhuk-Kale, where the Russian commander explicitly threatened to send the British ship to the bottom of the sea if it resisted confiscation.
To tighten this maritime strangulation, the Russian government reinforced the Black Sea cruiser squadron with heavily armed vessels, including the corvette Mesembria, a 44-gun frigate named Ibrail (Ibrailov), and the newly constructed large-caliber steamer Jason. Realizing that foreign weapons continued to flow through unoccupied coastal gaps, Emperor Nicholas ordered the absolute occupation of the entire Circassian, Abkhazian, and Mingrelian coastlines. This strategy aimed to encircle the Mountaineers with an uninterrupted, unbroken line of fortifications, rendering it impossible for them to import supplies or export goods without Russian permission. To eradicate the unified local resistance at its root, Russian Councils of War organized raids deep into the mountains with orders to scorch everything in their path. They went so far as to transport immense quantities of dry resinous wood and tar from the Kherson province to set the Caucasian forests ablaze. In retaliation for foreign-backed Mountaineer victories, Russia suspended operations in other regions and amassed a formidable force, merging the 5th Corps with other reinforcements to deploy over 70,000 troops into Circassia against the Mountaineer coalition.
Russian generals executed a methodical scorched-earth campaign designed to physically strip the Circassians of their natural defenses and resources. These raids relied on systemic environmental destruction to force the Mountain tribes into submission. Expeditionary forces entering the inland passes operated under explicit orders to "burn and destroy everything in their path." For example, General Grabbe's planned expedition to the Laba valley entailed the eradication of everything they encountered before the troops retreated to their winter quarters.
To prevent the Circassians from using dense woodlands for ambushes, the Russian army actively felled trees along their advance to carve secure military roads from Yekaterinodar to the coast. Deforestation was a logistical priority designed from the outset. The Russians timed these destructive offensives for late summer and autumn. By waiting for riverbeds to dry and leaves to fall, they secured accessible routes into the mountains.
When read strictly as a document collection, these distinct emphases can sometimes be overlooked individually. To ensure that readers do not miss this valuable information while examining the documents, I believe it would be beneficial to append such insights as explanatory notes in addition to footnotes when collating the document collections. I read this first book of the thirty-volume series with immense interest. We are in great need of such works that will provide us with new perspectives on the 19th-century Russo- Caucasian Wars. As historical writing becomes increasingly clichéd with each passing day, readers consume works of this nature with much greater appetite. I congratulate Azamat Kumykov for introducing this work to the literature, and we look forward with great anticipation to reading the subsequent books in the series.
Istanbul, 11 September 2026