During the Turkish Civil War and the early stages of the proclamation of the Republic, almost all political figures from the North Caucasian emigration fell afoul of Kemalist ideology at various times and were purged. The speech delivered by Mustafa Kemal Pasha at the 2nd Congress of the Republican Popular Party (CHP) in 1927 is the most striking indication of this. The fate of Bekir Sami (Kundukh) Bey, who had sided with Mustafa Kemal Pasha from the outset of the Turkish Civil War, is no different. When we examine Turkish state historiography, it's clear that Bekir Sami Bey was targeted by Kemalist circles from the days of the Moscow Conference in 1920 onward, and that his tendencies regarding Caucasian politics, in particular, were met with no sympathy. Those who memorized the official history penned by Kemalist ideology like a divine inscription did not hesitate to ignore, discredit, and denigrate Bekir Sami Bey's successful diplomacy at the London Conference, and to offer all manner of forced interpretations and destructive criticisms. The London Conference was an event organized by the Allies to reconsider the terms of the negotiations with Ottoman government officials, as the Allies were unable to implement the results of World War I and the Treaty of Sèvres on the Ottoman territory due to the resistance of nationalist Turkish groups. In fact, the Ankara Government was not even considered a party to the negotiations. When the Ankara Government delegation arrived in Rome on February 18, 1921, on its way to London, there was no invitation from London. The Allies invited solely representatives of the Istanbul Government to the meeting.
Bekir Sami Bey welcomed Mustafa Kemal Pasha in Tokat during his trip in 1919
When the Conference started on February 21, Bekir Sami Bey and his colleagues had not yet arrived in London. Through the Italian and French mediation, Bekir Sami Bey managed to persuade the British side to be admitted to the conference. At the conference, which he was able to attend from February 23 onwards, Bekir Sami Bey changed the balance of power and secured the recognition of the Ankara Government as the sole interlocutor, that is, the recognition of Turkey instead of the Ottoman Empire. Bekir Sami Bey, remaining loyal to the National Pact (Misak-ı Millî), requested that the future of Thrace and Izmir, the Sea of Marmara, the Straits, and the economic and financial restrictions imposed by the Treaty be placed on the agenda. The declaration he read was perfectly fitting to the spirit of the National Pact. It demanded the evacuation of all lands occupied by Greek forces in Eastern Thrace, Izmir, and Anatolia. Using statistics gathered from the Allies' own data sources, Bekir Sami Bey could clearly demonstrate the predominant Turkish population in the territories requested to be evacuated. Turkey recognized the Ottoman Empire's financial debts. When French Prime Minister Aristide Briand requested further details, Bekir Sami Bey sought time to contact Mustafa Kemal Pasha and, explaining that he needed time to prepare the requested information, promised to present it at the session to be held on February 25. However, he did not receive the expected response from Ankara within two days.
Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Bekir Sami Bey poses together with other members of the North Caucasian Immigration (Tokat 1919)
When the conference resumed on February 25, the representative of the Ottoman government formally waived his right to speak in favor of the head of the Ankara delegation. As emphasized at the session of February 23rd, Bekir Sami Bey stated that if the principles of the National Pact were adopted as the basis for the talks, the Turkish delegation would consent to the cessation of hostilities with Greece and the exchange of prisoners between all parties involved. Regarding the issue of accepting the remaining articles of the Treaty of Sèvres, he stated that the Ankara Government was ready to make sacrifices for an honorable peace, but by comparing Sèvres with the Treaties of Versailles, Saint-Germain, Neuilly, and Trianon, he made it clear that accepting such a treaty was incompatible with the rights of a sovereign state. Nevertheless, he stated that he would refer the matter to the Grand National Assembly (TBMM) for a final and definitive response. The Armenian representatives attending the next day's meeting demanded full compliance with the Treaty of Sèvres. However, they had no idea what the borders drawn by Wilson's principles looked like, nor the articles of the Treaty of Gyumri. Even the information they provided regarding the Armenian population in Cilicia was contradicted by their protector, the French delegation. The French representative stated that, according to official figures, this province comprised 314,000 Muslims and 55,000 Armenians in 1914. Despite this, the French declared their willingness to protect the Armenian minorities in Cilicia through a mixed gendarmerie or a similar arrangement. When the British invoked Kurdish autonomy, Bekir Sami Bey objected, saying that the Kurds did not want such a concession and that all they wanted was to live together in brotherly harmony with the Turks for centuries. He stated that there was no greater difference between Kurds and Turks than between an Englishman and a Scotsman, but, to satisfy the Allies, he stated that Ankara would agree to the dispatch of a commission of investigation or the holding of a referendum in the relevant regions.
Bekir Sami Bey and Mustafa Kemal Pasha during the days of the Amasya gatherings
Mustafa Kemal Pasha's reply to Bekir Sami Bey was received on March 1st. He instructed the Foreign Minister, whom he had sent to London with extraordinary powers, not to make individual comments on the National Pact during the talks. Mustafa Kemal Pasha declared that he did not want an investigative commission appointed under international military control regarding the Izmir and Thrace issues. He urged him to reject the Treaty of Sèvres outright, without even considering its articles. In his opinion, Armenian issues should not be discussed there because they had already been resolved between Ankara and the Soviet administration in Yerevan. He also threatened that if the French insisted on keeping their troops in Cilicia disguised as gendarmes, this would result in their forced removal. He imposed restrictions on Bekir Sami Bey, which he demanded he adhere to during the conference discussions. He demanded that no commitments be made without the government's approval and permission. He demanded that the prisoner exchange should not be discussed with the British without an absolute agreement being reached. In short, instead of supporting Bekir Sami Bey, who had secured recognition of the Ankara Government's legitimacy when even at a stage when his ability to reach London was questionable, Mustafa Kemal Pasha obstructed him with every possible means. Bekir Sami Bey, with a much broader vision, explained to the British that the issue was not limited to Anatolia. During the negotiations on March 4, he presented a detailed communiqué on the situation in the Caucasus. He emphasized the importance of Türkiye's leadership in establishing a Caucasian Confederation devoid of Pan-Turanist or Pan-Islamist objectives. This union of states would serve as a barrier against any northern threat, whether from the Bolsheviks, the Mensheviks, or the Tsarist government. Such a Caucasian Confederation would deprive the Bolshevik regime of not only the region's substantial grain resources but also the oil resources of Baku or Grozny. If Russia lost its oil, its economic life would be in stagnation, and it would become completely dependent on Britain. Furthermore, Turkey would have been doing Britain a great favor by containing the Bolshevik movement in Central Asia, including Bukhara and Khiva, as well as in Afghanistan. These were things Greece, as an ally and partner, could never promise. However, due to the intransigence of Greek politicians and the strange demands of the British, no concrete progress was made until March 9th at the conference. During this period, Bekir Sami Bey refused to compromise on any issue without Ankara's approval. On the contrary, he said that he could not confirm any decision without Ankara's consent. He requested a summary of the proposals of the Allies. He informed the Allies that if the Grand National Assembly agreed in principle with the summary proposals, the details could be discussed later. On March 10th, the Greeks told Lloyd George that they would not attack the Turks for another two weeks and would await Ankara's response to the proposals. On March 12th, the parties held a final meeting. At this meeting, Bekir Sami Bey stated that he did not accept responsibility for the failure to make peace due to Greece's intransigent stance. Taking advantage of the French hostility toward King Constantine and the Italians' reactions to the fait accompli in Izmir in 1919, Bekir Sami Bey managed to sign agreements with them. The agreement with the French was signed on March 11, the day before the conference officially concluded. The agreement stipulated the cessation of hostilities, the exchange of prisoners, the evacuation by French forces of all lands in Anatolia assigned to Syria by the Treaty of Sèvres, and the integration of these lands into the Turkish state. However, French officers would assist a newly organized police force in these territories, and all administrative personnel of Cilicia would remain on duty. Ethnic minorities would be protected, and French-Turkish economic cooperation would be ensured. The Ergene mine concessions would be given to a French group. The section of the Baghdad line between the Cilicia gates and Nusaybin would be transferred to the French group, and the border between Syria and Türkiye would be definitively determined. The agreement signed with the Italians on March 12 envisioned Italian-Turkish economic cooperation for the development of various provinces (Antalya, Afyon, Konya, etc.) along with the granting of various privileges. Furthermore, the Hereclea (Zonguldak) coal mine concession would be granted to an Italian-Turkish group. In exchange for these privileges, the Italian government pledged to provide effective support to the Turkish delegation for the return of Thrace and Izmir to Türkiye. These provisions would enter into force through a contract between the two parties immediately following the signing of the peace treaty, guaranteeing Turkish independence.
Bekir Sami Bey and Mustafa Kemal Pasha at the Sivas Congress
In conclusion, Bekir Sami Bey, during the time he spent in London, did not, as claimed, take any action on his own initiative that would jeopardise Turkey's sovereign rights. However, due to the intransigence of the Greek and British sides as well as the obstruction from Ankara, he was unable to fully achieve his desired objectives. He deliberately avoided any attempts to endanger himself or the country he represented on matters that were left vague. He succeeded in dividing the unity of the Allied Powers. The British accused the French of violating the London Agreement of November 1915, under which the Allies (Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan) pledged not to make a separate peace with their enemies without consulting each other. The French, however, maintained that they had not concealed this agreement from London. These agreements, which Mustafa Kemal Pasha denied, in reality constituted the official recognition of the Ankara Government by the Allies. Bekir Sami Bey and his colleagues remained in London until March 17. During this period, a preliminary agreement was signed with Lord Curzon for the exchange of Turkish and British prisoners. Bekir Sami Bey, on his way back, stopped in Paris on March 18th. There, he informed the public of the results of the London conference. However, this information was never heard by the people in Anatolia, or it was not allowed to be heard. Addressing the Chamber of Deputies in Rome on March 21st, the Italian representative, Count Sforza, stated that his government recognized the importance of the Nationalist Movement in Anatolia and that they would adopt a policy of conciliation at the conference. Regarding the Treaty of Sèvres, he emphasized that there was no basis for implementing the Treaty of Sèvres unless some of its fundamental articles were amended. Count Sforza also announced the signing of the Italo-Turkish agreement and expressed his hope that major Italian investments would be made in Türkiye after peace was achieved. Aristide Briand also informed the French Parliament about the London conference on March 16th. He stated that dissolving the Treaty of Sèvres on its old foundations was no longer possible. France was waging a war in Anatolia for humanitarian reasons to protect minorities, but this policy had cost many lives and property. Therefore, he stated that a compromise that would lead to peace was absolutely necessary. Referring to Bekir Sami Bey, he concluded by saying that after meeting with the Ankara representative, who "speaks French as good as a native tongue," France and Turkey had reached an agreement. The Ankara government learned of the minutes of the London conference through an encrypted telegram sent by Bekir Sami Bey on March 12 and arriving in Ankara on the evening of March 13. It was alleged that the contents of the telegram were read at a secret session of the Grand National Assembly on March 17. From the statements in the minutes, it was doubtful whether the text read was actually the telegram received, or even whether the telegram included in the minutes was actually read. Consequently, the deputies accused the delegation members of incompetence and bad faith. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, assessing the tension building in Parliament, asked Acting Foreign Minister Ahmet Muhtar Bey to read the cabinet statement refuting the agreement Bekir Sami Bey had signed with the French. Yet, he would personally sign an almost identical version of this agreement to the Allies in October that he had ordered to be refuted in May. The Parliament then decided to wait for Bekir Sami Bey's return for accountability. In other words, Bekir Sami Bey would be thrown as bait to a pack of provoked lions. Yet, despite Ankara's obstruction, Bekir Sami Bey had achieved a diplomatic victory in London. Transportation difficulties delayed the delegation in Europe for some time. After traveling via Bucharest and Constanta and then by sea to Inebolu, the delegation reached Ankara in the first week of May. Immediately after his arrival, Bekir Sami Bey was forced to resign. Despite the atmosphere Mustafa Kemal Pasha created during the secret session on May 12th, the Assembly, which heard Bekir Sami Bey, accepted his resignation but was forced to acquit him. Bekir Sami Bey stated that he was solely responsible for his actions and declared his readiness to answer for his actions at the Extraordinary Independence Military Tribunal (Istiklal Mahkemesi) if the Assembly so demanded. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, however, managed to exploit the Assembly's stance to his own advantage. Despite all the defamatory and discrediting remarks about Bekir Sami Bey in his absence, he declared from the Assembly podium that he intended to send him back to Europe. Meanwhile, although the Greeks adhered to their commitment at the conference to postpone their attacks on Eskişehir for two weeks, they realized they would not achieve results that met their expectations from the conference's outcomes, so they continued their advance toward Eskişehir as of the last week of March. In other words, between February 23rd and March 12th, when Bekir Sami Bey was in London seeking the best solution for Turkey, Anatolia was under threat from the advance of powerful Greek Armies. In other words, Bekir Sami Bey was not provided with the support of a front-line victory that would strengthen his position at the negotiation table in London. The Second Battle of İnönü, which started on March 23rd, culminated in the Greek Army's retreat towards Uşak and Bursa on March 31st. The government, whose self-confidence had been boosted by these front-line successes, was not able to analyze Bekir Sami Bey's diplomatic achievements accurately in the dog-eat-dog world of politics in those days when such successes were yet to be reported. Likewise, those in power had no such intention. Ankara's attitude toward Bekir Sami Bey's successes in London was like the story of the wolf and the lamb who met on the riverbank:
One day, a wolf and a lamb met on the riverbank where they had gone to drink water. The wolf was drinking upstream, while the lamb was quenching its thirst downstream. Suspecting the wolf's intentions, the lamb asked: Lamb: "Brother Wolf, why are you looking at me so angrily?" Wolf: "I'm angry at you for polluting my water." Lamb: "But that's not possible, because I'm downstream." Wolf: "Anyway, I'll hunt you..."