TürkçeTurkey has always occupied a significant place in the North Caucasian Historical Memory, thanks to its decisive roles in historical events since the Ottoman Empire and the over five million North Caucasian immigrants it has hosted. Therefore, Turkey's dynamics are a factor that must be considered in the historical, current, and future thinking of North Caucasians.
Haydar Bammate continuously evaluated the relations between Turkey and the Caucasus in the journals he published in Russian, French, English, German, and Turkish from 1934 onwards, and made striking observations regarding the course of these relations in environments that changed according to the dynamics of the period. One of the most notable of these articles is the article titled “Turkey and the Caucasus”, which he wrote in 1937.
The author argues that such interpretations misunderstand both Turkish interests and Caucasian aspirations. He highlights the political conclusions reached by the expert D. Mille, who finds no convincing evidence of a secret Ankara–Moscow pact. Rather, post-war Turkey is presented as having acted consistently according to its national interests and geopolitical circumstances.
Bammate emphasizes the primary political objectives of Caucasian independence movements as the absolute and unconditional independence from Russia, recognized by all powers, and the establishment of a united Caucasian confederation of all Caucasian peoples.
He argues that maintaining friendly relations with Turkey is an essential element of that national program—not rooted in sentimental or cultural affinity alone, but in strategic necessity. Geography dictates that Turkey is the natural southern partner of the Caucasus, and an independent Caucasian state can only survive through close cooperation with Turkey.
The author insists that such a pro-Turkish stance is not betrayal but a cornerstone of Caucasian survival and resistance to Soviet rule. Conversely, he accuses some Caucasian political circles—particularly Armenian and Georgian factions aligned with socialist or pro-Russian positions—of undermining the Caucasian cause by clinging to outdated ties with Russia or to international socialist networks.
Bammate interprets Turkey’s public diplomatic friendliness toward the USSR as a temporary, pragmatic response to the international situation. As the Soviet Union faces crises on its western and eastern borders, Moscow aims to stabilize relations with Ankara. Turkey benefits from this “breathing space,” allowing domestic reforms and consolidation under Atatürk’s leadership.
However, Bammate argues that Turkey’s deeper, long-term interests align not with the maintenance of Soviet power but with the eventual emergence of an independent Caucasus. He rejects the idea that Turkey would act as a Soviet policeman in the Caucasus during a future geopolitical crisis. Turkey would not jeopardize its own patriotic goals or align itself against the Caucasian nations, especially when the collapse of Soviet power appears historically inevitable. Bammate believes that the Soviet system is nearing collapse. The Caucasian nations—12 million strong—are ready to reclaim independence. Turkey, when the opportunity arises, will support their aspirations rather than hinder them.
He concludes that Ankara’s “wait-and-see” posture is dictated by circumstances. When conditions align with its vital interests (which he sees as harmonious with Caucasian independence), Turkey will act decisively in favor of the Caucasian cause. The moment has not yet come, but the author expresses confidence that it will.
Bammate’s five distilled themes in this article are as follows:
- Turkish pragmatism/balancing — Ankara acts from national interest, not ideology.
- Pro-Turkish Caucasian nationalism — Caucasian émigré aspiration for a pro-Turkish independent Caucasus.
- Geography as destiny — the location of the Trans-Caucasus makes Turkey the natural southern partner.
- Skepticism toward Soviet/Russian ‘friendship’ — Soviet friendliness is tactical, not genuine.
- Opportunity & timing — Turkey should wait for the right moment (when Soviet power weakens) to act in favor of Caucasian independence.
Overall, Bammate’s views reflect consistent patterns. Turkey today still shows the core traits Bammate highlighted (pragmatism, tactical cooperation with Russia, close ties to Turkic peoples), but with new tools and new constraints such as NATO membership, energy interdependence, and a more muscular regional posture. Modern Ankara routinely balances ties with NATO partners and Russia while extracting concrete benefits such as weapons, energy, and diplomatic leverage. For Example, Turkey hosts/uses the Russia→Turkey Turk Stream gas route and simultaneously pursues other partners to diversify supplies. Turkey has turned rhetorical “unity” into substantive backing for Azerbaijan in the Trans-Caucasus (diplomatic, military, and political support in 2020 and after), while engaging in limited normalization with Armenia for economic and regional influence. Turkey projects influence across the Black Sea and Trans-Caucasus by combining diplomacy, energy infrastructure, trade, and military presence — exactly the sorts of levers Bammate expected would matter. Ankara cooperates with Moscow where needed (energy, Syria deconfliction) but resists Russian dominance due to ongoing skepticism. It exploits opportunities when Russian influence weakens in a region (e.g., backing Baku in 2020).
Bammate was right with his assessment about Ankara’s pragmatic behaviour. It is a natural southern partner for many Caucasian actors: Turkey will pursue influence rather than ideological vassalage. Bammate’s central forecast was correct about Turkey’s utilization of opportunities, and will not act as a mere Soviet policeman is also reflected in modern times' policy.
However, what differs from Bammate’s assessments today are the following:
— The Cold War is over; Turkey is a NATO member with global entanglements. Its choices are constrained by alliance politics, the EU, NATO obligations, and major-power competition.
— Energy interdependence with Russia is deeper and more institutionalized (pipelines, payments) than Bammate envisaged, producing real leverage for Moscow and real vulnerability for Ankara — even while Ankara diversifies.
— Turkey’s military tools and active-defense posture (Syria, Libya, support for Baku) are far more developed than in the 1937 context.
Benefiting from this occasion, I will also share with you Bammate’s lengthy article titled "La Position de la Turquie" (Turkey's Position), published in the Swiss magazine Le Mois Suisses in 1943, during the ravages of World War II, and offer a comparative summary of this article with contemporary dynamics.
Historical Context and Foundational Constants
Bammate argues that Turkey’s foreign policy is shaped by three enduring geopolitical constants:
— Its geographic proximity and historical rivalry with Russia, especially concerning the Straits (Dardanelles and Bosphorus).
— Its long-standing relationship with England, shaped by Anglo-Russian rivalry.
— Its position as the strongest independent Muslim state, with cultural and moral influence on other Turkic and Muslim peoples.
These constants underpin Turkish diplomatic behavior and its choices during global upheavals.
Turkey and Russia: A History of Mutual Suspicion
The article devotes large sections to recounting Russia’s expansionist ambitions, rooted in ideological and historical traditions:
The “Testament of Peter the Great,” whether authentic or not, influenced Russian imperial policy, justifying expansion toward warm seas and the Straits. After all, Bammate also gives a very clear picture of the Russian political thought—from panslavists to westernizers—that shared the same expansionist outlook.
During the Ottoman collapse and the rise of the Turkish national movement, Soviet Russia provided crucial support to Atatürk’s struggle, not out of idealism, but because preventing Western control of Constantinople and the Straits aligned with Russian strategic interests. The article also highlights Turkish military involvement in Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus in 1918, showing early strains between the new Turkish nationalism and Russian Bolshevism. According to Bammate, the revived Russian expansion into the Balkans and toward the Mediterranean remains the main long-term threat to Turkey.
Turkey and the West: The British Connection
England historically acted as Turkey’s protector against Russia throughout the 19th century. The Crimean War and the Congress of Berlin are cited as major examples. Yet British policy fluctuated, including proposals to partition Turkey in the late 19th century. By the 1930s, renewed Anglo-Turkish friendship emerged, driven by:
— Turkey’s importance in balancing Russia
— The Montreux Convention, restoring Turkish control over the Straits
The 1939 Anglo-Turkish alliance and the U.S. Lend-Lease framework further integrated Turkey into Western diplomatic networks. However, Turkish leaders remained cautious, wary of being entangled in Western commitments without sufficient guarantees.
National Revival and the Rise of the Pan-Turkist Movement
The article examines ideological developments:
— Rise of Turan, inspired by thinkers like Ziya Gökalp, Youssouf Akchoura, and Hussein Zade.
— Renewed interest in ethnic and cultural ties with Turkic peoples in Central Asia and Russia.
Bammate predicts that Turanism will increasingly influence Turkish public opinion and its long-term political orientation.
He suggests that in the future:
A bloc of independent Turkic and Muslim states in the Caucasus, Turkestan, and Idel-Ural, aligned with Turkey, could become a powerful regional stabilizing force.
This vision is presented as a counterweight to Russian and British ambitions.
Turkey During the Second World War: Strategic Neutrality
The central theme is Turkey’s strict neutrality and exceptional diplomatic finesse. Bammate highlights:
— Turkey’s neutrality benefits both the Allies and the Axis.
— It protected the Middle East from Axis advance during the Germans’ offensive.
— It prevented British forces in Iran/Iraq from threatening the German eastern front.
— Turkey’s military strength and rugged geography made forced intervention costly and unlikely.
The article emphasizes that Turkish policy is guided solely by “l’intérêt turc” — not ideology or pressure from foreign powers.
External Pressures and the Balkan Question
Possible Allied landings in the Balkans (Salonika scenario) will have serious consequences for Turkey. Turkey’s security system in the Straits depends on:
— Territorial status quo
— Appropriate relations with Germany and Bulgaria
A sudden change would force Turkey into countermeasures — political or military — depending on circumstances. The possibility of Russian troops entering Bulgaria is highlighted as especially alarming to Turkey.
The Russian Threat and Distrust of British Guarantees
The article detects deep Turkish anxiety regarding:
— British-Russian agreements giving Moscow “free hands” in the Balkans
— Winston Churchill’s attempts during the Adana meetings to reassure Ankara
The Turkish press is quoted as saying that any threat to the Straits is a direct threat to national life. There is skepticism that Britain would intervene immediately against Russia if the Straits were threatened.
Turkey's Geopolitical Importance in 1943
Bammate concludes:
— Turkey’s significance grows as the war drags on.
— Its military and strategic weight could tilt the balance if it chose a side.
This unique leverage explains the diplomatic courtesies, economic advantages, and political attention Ankara receives from all sides.
Finally, Bammate Assesses that Turkey is:
— A reborn regional power
— Strong, disciplined, and determined
— Guided by a clear and self-interested realism
— Positioned at the crossroads of three continents
— Engaged in a delicate balancing act between Russia, England, Germany, and the U.S.
The future course of the war and the postwar settlement will determine whether Turkey’s strategic neutrality can be maintained — or whether it must eventually choose a side.
Bammate repeatedly treats Turkey’s location (the Straits, crossroads of three continents) as the single most important factor shaping Turkish policy: everything — alliances, fears, opportunities — flows from geography. The article emphasizes Turkey’s skillful neutrality in 1943. Ankara leverages both sides (Allies and Axis) to extract economic and political gains while avoiding a commitment that might endanger the state. Bammate presents neutrality as pragmatic self-interest rather than ideological. A long section recounts centuries of Russo-Ottoman rivalry and treats Russian access to the Straits as an existential fear for Turks; this historical memory informs Turkey’s suspicion of Russian intentions. The article shows that Britain has alternately been protector and exploiter; Turkey’s diplomacy therefore uses relations with Britain (and the US) as a counterweight to Russia while remaining cautious about Western guarantees. Bammate documents an intellectual/political turn toward Turanism (pan-Turkic identity and interest in Turkic peoples of the USSR) as a growing domestic influence that could reshape Turkey’s regional aims. The author argues that Turkey’s army, its geography, and the cost of forcing Anatolia make a successful wartime coercion of Turkey unlikely — hence Ankara’s bargaining power.
Therefore, Bammate frames Turkey as a revived regional actor using neutrality, historical memory, and a rising national ideology (Turanism) to preserve independence and pursue long-term strategic goals in a dangerous great-power contest.
When we compare Bammate’s assessments with modern Turkish foreign policy (2024–2025), we can focus on the following seven major points:
1) Geography still matters — continuity
Then: Straits and crossroads determine strategy.
Now: Geography and transit routes (Black Sea, South Caucasus, Middle East) continue to shape priorities: Turkey focuses on corridors, energy routes, and regional connectivity. Contemporary analyses describe Turkey’s policy as emphasizing regional influence and strategic transit roles.
2) From strict neutrality to pragmatic, interest-based multi-vector diplomacy
Then: Formal neutrality and strict balance between camps.
Now: Turkey pursues a pragmatic, interest-based, and often independent (sometimes called “strategic autonomy” or “adaptive opportunism”) foreign policy — it balances ties with NATO/the US, Russia, China, and regional actors rather than aligning automatically with one camp. Think-tank and academic reviews for 2024–25 emphasize this pragmatic/autonomous posture.
3) Russia: historic suspicion, practical cooperation — a fraught partnership
Then: Russia was the long-term existential threat; Turkish policy was built around preventing Russian control of the Straits.
Now: Relationship is ambivalent — intense economic and energy ties (and high-level personal diplomacy) sit alongside rivalry and mistrust. Turkey cooperates with Russia where convenient (energy, trade, regional deal-making) but resists Russian dominance and has adjusted its trade/exports when pressured by partners (e.g., sanctions context). Observers describe the tie as an “ambiguous partnership.”
4) Britain / USA or Western world in general: from protector to partner — but guarantees remain conditional
Then: Britain was historically the counterweight to Russia but also self-interested.
Now: Turkey remains a NATO member and still relies on ties with the West for security, trade, and technology — but it increasingly uses NATO membership instrumentally (e.g., bargaining on Sweden’s accession, F-16s) and will not accept Western policy prescriptions that contradict core Turkish interests. Analysts note Turkey’s transactional use of Western ties.
5) Turkic/soft-power agenda: institutionalized and active
Then: Bammate observed rising Turanism and hopes for a Turkic bloc.
Now: Turkey has institutionalized relations with Turkic states (summits, organizations, trade, cultural diplomacy). Ankara actively cultivates Central Asian and Azerbaijan ties and projects soft power across the Muslim world and Africa. Academic studies and policy papers document increasing institutional ties to the “Turkic world.”
6) Use of hard power and interventionism — a key divergence
Then: Bammate imagined Turkey avoiding intervention unless forced; deterrence relied on geography and army.
Now: Turkey has demonstrated willingness to use military force abroad (northern Syria, operations in Iraq, interventions in Libya, active diplomacy and posture in the South Caucasus). This assertive use of hard power, combined with diplomatic bargaining, marks a departure from the stricter neutrality Bammate described. Observers describe Turkey’s behaviour since the 2010s as more interventionist and projection-oriented.
7) Domestic politics & personalization of foreign policy
Then: the Article treats foreign policy as statecraft tied to national interest and ideas like Turanism.
Now: Foreign policy under Tayyip Erdoğan is also a tool of domestic politics and legitimacy: abroad, high-profile diplomacy (brokerage roles, bold visits, personalized summits) reinforces domestic standing. Academic analysis notes the “political utility” of foreign policy for regime legitimacy.
Thus, a short conclusion can be drawn by analyzing what Bammate got right / what changed. Geography, historical memory (especially vis-à-vis Russia), and a preference for pragmatic balancing are durable drivers of Turkish foreign policy. What has changed? Turkey is no longer strictly “neutral” in the 20th-century sense; it is an assertive, multi-vector power that mixes cooperation with competition, uses military tools abroad, institutionalizes ties with Turkic states, and personalizes diplomacy under Erdoğan. These developments reflect Turkey’s larger capacity and changed international context (post-Cold War institutions, NATO membership, new regional theatres).
We can map Bammate’s five main themes to concrete modern events as follows:
1) Strategic geography → modern energy & transit leverage
Bammate: Turkey’s geography (the Straits; crossroads of Europe, Asia, Middle East) is the main structural driver of its policy.
Modern events: TurkStream (Russia → Turkey → Europe) (inaugurated Jan 2020) — a high-profile Russian-Turkish pipeline that makes the Black Sea-Turkey route a major European gas corridor and illustrates how Ankara exploits transit geography for strategic leverage. Ambition to be an energy/transit hub — Turkey’s continuing policy to host pipelines, power links, and transport corridors (e.g., corridor diplomacy linking Caucasus–Turkey–Europe) shows the same geography-driven logic Bammate stressed.
2) Balance/neutrality as an instrument → modern multi-vector/strategic autonomy
Bammate: In 1943, Turkey practiced strict neutrality and balanced offers and pressures from both camps to maximize national interest.
Modern events: Pragmatic multi-vector diplomacy vs. strict neutrality — Today, Turkey no longer tries to be “neutral WWII-style,” but practices interest-driven balancing: it remains a NATO member while engaging Russia, China, and regional actors when useful (e.g., gas/defence/trade deals). This is sometimes called “strategic autonomy.”
NATO bargaining over Sweden – transactional diplomacy — Turkey used its NATO ratification leverage to secure counter-terrorism and diplomatic concessions from Sweden; its eventual ratification was paired with parallel security/Diplomatic deals (and later US F-16 sale signalling transactional leverage).
3) Historical memory of Russia as an existential challenge → practical cooperation + rivalry today
Bammate: Centuries of Russo-Ottoman conflict made Russia the principal long-term Turkish worry (esp. control of the Straits).
Modern events: Ambiguous Turkey–Russia relationship — Ankara cooperates with Moscow on energy (TurkStream) and certain regional deals (Idlib de-confliction, Astana talks), but remains suspicious of Russian influence and counters it where necessary — echoing the old mix of fear and pragmatic accommodation.
Trans-Caucasus (2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war & after-effects) — Turkey’s strong backing of Azerbaijan in 2020 altered the regional balance and reduced Moscow’s exclusive leverage, showing Ankara actively contesting Russian influence in zones that Bammate worried about. (Russia still plays a key mediator/peacekeeper role, so rivalry + cooperation continue.)
4) Instrumental relationship with Britain/West → NATO membership + transactional Western ties
Bammate: Britain historically functioned as a counterweight to Russia; Turkey used ties with the West instrumentally.
Modern events: NATO membership as bargaining chip — Turkey has used its position inside NATO to extract political and military returns (e.g., delays/conditions around Sweden’s accession; negotiating US arms sales like the F-16 package tied to NATO issues). This mirrors the instrumental West-relationship Bammate described, but in a contemporary institutional form.
Lend-Lease → modern security/arms diplomacy — Just as inter-war guarantees mattered then, now Turkey’s security ties (and disputes) with the US/EU shape Ankara’s options and bargaining power on regional matters.
5) Rising “Turanism” / pan-Turkic orientation → institutionalized Turkic diplomacy and active regional projection
Bammate: He flagged the growth of turquisme and the prospect of Turkey cultivating Turkic peoples as an expanding policy current.
Modern events: Organization of Turkic States (OTS) institutionalization — Since the 2010s, Ankara has helped institutionalize cooperation among Turkic countries (summits, economic and cultural projects), turning the pan-Turkic idea into a formal multilateral platform (e.g., OTS summits in 2021–2023). This is a clear realization of Bammate’s “Turanism” theme at the state level.
Support for Azerbaijan in 2020 and afterwards — Turkey’s direct diplomatic, political, and military backing for Baku in the 2020 war, and subsequent deepening of bilateral cooperation, exemplify the political, military, and emotional dimensions of an activist pan-Turkic foreign policy.
Bammate’s core structural insights (geography → strategy; Russia as a long-term concern; use of external great-power rivalry to Turkey’s advantage) remain useful lenses for understanding Ankara.
What changed from strict wartime neutrality has been replaced by a confident, interventionist, multi-vector foreign policy that mixes cooperation with Russia (energy, diplomacy) and robust Western/NATO engagement — but always instrumentally, to maximize Turkish interests.
For Example: TurkStream, Syrian cross-border operations (Euphrates Shield / Olive Branch / Peace Spring), 2020 Karabakh support for Azerbaijan, and trade/security bargaining inside NATO (Sweden/F-16).
So, where were we, the peoples of the North Caucasus, intellectually speaking, in 1943? Where do we stand now?
In 1943, with the war and Stalinist terror raging in the Caucasus, and the military alliance with Germany failing, there was not much to say about the homeland. European immigration organizations, however, were powerless in their forced marriage with Nazi Germany, lacking the capacity to develop policies. The situation in Turkey was no different. Although there was a very strong North Caucasian presence in the army, judiciary, politics, and bureaucracy, it seems it was impossible to become a decisive force in the climate created by the İnönü government and World War II.
During the Cold War, the United States, as NATO's driving force, increased its interest in North Caucasian political figures living in Turkey and Europe. From the 1950s onward, the political and bureaucratic power of the North Caucasian immigrants in Turkey significantly developed in a way that supported Bammat's political predictions. Indeed, Bammat's prediction of the collapse of the USSR also came true, and by the late 1980s and early 1990s, the USSR had gradually vanished from history. Bammat's predictions regarding the Turkey-Caucasus axis also proved accurate in the first decade following 1990, and Turkish diplomacy, under the slogan " From the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China, Turks!", pursued a policy of supporting the independence hopes of the North Caucasian nations. However, as a result of the political changes in Russia and Turkey from the early 2000s onward, a sharp shift is being observed in the Caucasian policy of Turkey. Over time, Ankara completely abandoned the Northern Caucasus to Russia's sphere of influence, while, in line with the developments I have detailed above, it limited its focus to Azerbaijan. Even in the Abkhazia-Georgia and South Ossetia-Georgia conflicts, it deliberately avoided taking a strong side, appearing to be a compliant follower of Western politics, not only refraining from supporting Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but also deliberately avoiding any moves that would seriously offend Russia. Although Turkish diplomacy appears to continue to romanticize the North Caucasian peoples within the framework of “Relative Communities”, as long as the current climate prevails, it will continue to view the North Caucasus as Russia's backyard.
Therefore, some of Bammat's assessments from World War II appear to be outdated today. With the collapse of the USSR, the North Caucasian people, whose hopes for independence had blossomed just as the Russian Empire did during its waning days, were increasingly dragged into a vortex of poverty, powerlessness, dysfunction, and ignorance in this increasingly complex political climate, becoming entirely passive factors in the political arena. Unable to break free from the trajectory set by external actors, unable to develop political solutions for their own future, and driven by a completely reactive life cycle devoid of cause-and-effect relationships, the future for the North Caucasian community, neither in their homeland nor in the immigration life, appears promising.
Cem Kumuk
Istanbul, 11 November 2025