Türkçe TercümeWe commemorated the 80th anniversary of the Drau Massacre with greater intensity this year. Thanks to the initiatives of Mr. Veysel Arıhan, Chairman of the Board of the Caucasus Foundation, European Union funds for encouraging young people to take cultural tours by train and incentives of the Directorate General for Turks Abroad and Related Communities under the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of the Republic of Turkey were secured. This transformed the commemoration of the Drau Disaster into a comprehensive project.
In the first phase of the project, a documentary film was recorded, including interviews with a group of opinion leaders and academics, as well as Fatima Tambiy and Albert Amberger, witnesses of the Drau Disaster.
In April, a group of approximately 30 young people followed in the footsteps of the victims of the Drau Disaster, traveling by train through Budapest and Vienna to the Drau Valley. They completed the second phase of the project by visiting the town of Paluzza, where refugees lived in northern Italy for about a year, and by organizing a ceremony in front of the Drau Victims Memorial in the village of Irschen, creating a powerful memory-place connection.
The project activities were completed on Friday, May 30, with a panel discussion and documentary screening held at Fatih Sultan Mehmet University in Istanbul.
On the final day of the commemorative events, I participated as a guest on Pelin Cift's “Gündemin Ötesi” (Beyond the Agenda) program, sharing insights with the Turkish public about the presence of Caucasus Mountain peoples during World War II and the Drau Disaster. As part of the project, a scientific historical monograph written by me and a collection of oral history narratives compiled by Prof. Dr. Ufuk Tavkul, based on the memories of the victims of the Drau, will be published by the Ministry of Culture, YTB Publications. The monograph, which was based on documents I collected during my research in 21 different archives in the Caucasian Republics and central government of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, Poland, Germany, France, Georgia, and Switzerland, as well as Haydar Bammat's private archive, utilizes over seventy primary sources and nearly thirty different periodicals as references. Although such a study would typically take several years to complete under normal circumstances, I managed to deliver the final proof to the publisher in just a few months. I hope you will enjoy reading the book when it hits the shelves.
Although the events in Drau have been portrayed in historical literature as Stalin's relentless pursuit of his victims, the main actors in the tragedy in Drau were not Stalin alone, but British and American politicians and military leaders. Let’s briefly refresh our memories and see what happened in Drau at the end of May and the beginning of June 1945:
As World War II was drawing to an end, Caucasian refugees who had sought mercy from Hitler while fleeing Stalin’s oppression were swept as far as the Friuli region of Italy in the wake of the retreating German Army. As the threat posed by Italian and Yugoslav Communist partisans became unbearable in the final weeks of the war, thousands of refugees set out from Italy on May 1, braving avalanches, landslides, and freezing temperatures, crossing the Alps via the Plöcken Pass and reaching Austria on May 4. They hoped that the British or Americans would seize the region before the Soviet Red Army and bring them freedom.
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ANYONE WHOSE SOVIET CITIZENSHIP WAS NOT IN DOUBT WOULD BE REPATRIATED REGARDLESS OF THEIR WISHES.
Anyone who had come from areas within the borders of the Soviet Union before the outbreak of war would be considered a Soviet citizen under British law. Anyone whose Soviet citizenship was not in doubt would be repatriated regardless of their wishes. Those whose nationality was in question would be sent to Prisoner of War Camp No. 373 and await judgment. [1]
Subsequently, General Musson, commander of the 78th Infantry Division, issued a warning order on May 19 that concerned all units. The order specified strict rules that personnel must follow regarding Caucasian and Cossack prisoners of war. The British general was displeased with his soldiers' friendly relations with the Caucasian prisoners of war. Considering the events that would unfold in the coming days, he wanted them to adopt an extremely harsh stance. [2]
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The definition of Soviet citizenship, which was used to prevent possible unrest during the repatriation of refugees to the Soviets, clearly revealed the contradictions in the logic of the operation.[5] For example, the personnel of the Russian Protection Corps (Russisches Schutzkorps), which was active in Yugoslav territory in 1941, were excluded from the definition of “Soviet citizen.”
It was clear that this operation was not, as claimed, a result of the secret agreement made in Yalta in February 1945. The Yalta Agreement was nothing more than an attempt to justify an operation that had been ongoing since 1944 between British and Soviet officials. The British had begun handing over people who had surrendered to them to the Soviets long before the Yalta Agreement. The British Government had bowed to Stalin's threats regarding British prisoners of war who had been “rescued” in areas under Soviet control.[6] The British Government, to eliminate the risk of ill-treatment of British prisoners in German prisoner-of-war camps captured by the Soviets, was handing over Soviet prisoners of war captured in German prisoner-of-war camps to Stalin, despite the very distinct terms of the Geneva Conventions.[7]
WHEN THE TIME COMES, EVERYBODY OF INTEREST TO THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES SHOULD BE HANDED OVER TO THEM. THEIR EXECUTION OR MORE SEVERE TREATMENT COMPARED TO THE BRITISH LAW IS OF NO CONCERN TO THEM: “WE CANNOT AFFORD TO BE EMOTIONAL ON THIS ISSUE”
On July 17, 1944, the British War Cabinet had already accepted the Soviets' demand for the repatriation of prisoners. On July 20, 1944, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden told the Soviet ambassador to London that thousands of Soviet citizens fighting on the German side in France had been captured and that these prisoners of war were currently on their way to England. This was not an exchange of information, but rather an expression of helplessness stemming from ignorance about what to do with these prisoners of war. During this meeting, Eden told the Soviet ambassador that the Soviet Government would undoubtedly wish to investigate in detail the circumstances under which these Soviet citizens came to serve in enemy military or paramilitary formations and the conditions under which they are currently detained. To this end, His Majesty's Government is willing to make arrangements for Soviet authorities in the United Kingdom to have direct contact with these Soviet citizens.
The British Foreign Office's view on the matter was extremely clear. In their opinion, this was entirely a matter for the Soviet authorities and did not concern His Majesty's Government. When the time comes, everybody of interest to the Soviet authorities should be handed over to them. Their execution or more severe treatment compared to the British law is of no concern to them.[8]
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden had told Prime Minister Winston Churchill, “We cannot afford to be emotional on this issue,” to avoid causing tension in relations with the Soviets.[9] Ultimately, the British Government sought to legitimize the crime against humanity by officially stating its position on the matter on September 3, 1944, months before the Yalta Agreement.
“Despite the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, a soldier who is captured by his own forces while serving in enemy forces cannot demand that the provisions of the Convention be applied to him against his own government and his own law. We should certainly not be prepared to grant such a right to a British subject who is captured while serving in German forces. If such a man is captured by an Allied force, the Allied government has the right to hand him over to his own government unconditionally without holding itself responsible for violating the Convention. Any other procedure could put us in an indefensible position against Allied governments that claim we are trying to protect possible traitors from the penalties imposed on them by their own laws.” [10]
Correspondence between US officials reveals that the US Army had begun handing over prisoners to the Soviets long before the Yalta Agreement. A document dated November 24, 1944, clearly states that American Army units had stopped handing over captured Russian nationals to the British since September 1944 and that all captured Russian nationals were handed over to the Soviets by a special agreement between the British and Soviet governments. [11] In addition, Soviet officials wanted to conduct constant inspections of prisoner camps under British-American control to ensure that the people they wanted were being repatriated.[12] All decisions made and correspondence conducted clearly showed that the Anglo-American alliance had been in full consent with the Soviets from the outset that prisoners would be returned to Stalin.[13] Western allies not only handed over Soviet prisoners to SMERSH (Smert Shpionam / Death to Spies) agents, but also provided all kinds of logistics support and directly transported them to the Soviet Union. An archival document shows that some of a group of prisoners of war who were being forcibly taken to the Soviets attempted to escape by jumping from the British warship “Circassia” as it passed through the Bosphorus Strait. The British Naval Attaché assisted in the transfer of the fugitives, who were captured by Turkish authorities, to the Soviet Union.[14]
The first article of the Yalta Agreement shows that the fundamental reason for signing this agreement was to justify this lawlessness: “All Soviet citizens rescued by forces under US command and all US citizens rescued by forces under Soviet command shall, without delay after their rescue, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and shall be held in camps or gathering points, as the case may be, and shall be kept separate from them until they are handed over to Soviet or United States authorities at locations agreed upon between the authorities."[15]
The two most important points to note in the text are the concepts of ‘rescue’ and ‘Soviet citizenship.’ This is because the act of rescue, by definition, refers to the act of being saved with the help of another person, the act of escaping is understood to mean overcoming a dangerous or adverse situation; distancing oneself from an unwanted, troublesome, or unpleasant person, place, or situation, or breaking ties and fleeing. Therefore, it was not possible to speak of a rescue operation here. On the contrary, the people who were trying to escape would be handed over to the very oppressors they were trying to escape from.
In Julius Epstein's work “Keelhaul Operation,” it was clearly stated that, per the relevant articles of the 1929 Geneva Convention, all prisoners of war captured in enemy uniform, even if they were Soviet citizens, should be treated as enemy soldiers if they were wearing German uniforms. Otherwise, it would have given the Germans an opportunity for retaliation. For this reason, this repatriation process, which had been carried out secretly during the first two years of the war, became more brazenly carried out in the final one-and-a-half years of the war as Germany's defeat became inevitable.
THE LACK OF ANY OTHER OPTION WAS A GREAT SOURCE OF REGRET FOR ME. IN EXCHANGE, WE AT LEAST RECOVERED APPROXIMATELY 2,000 BRITISH PRISONERS AND WOUNDED WHO WERE IN THE AREA AND IN GERMAN HANDS...
Harold Macmillan, the British Minister responsible for the Mediterranean region, went to Klagenfurt on May 13 to meet with General Keightley and requested that the handover of the Caucasians to the Soviets be expedited. In his memoirs, Harold Macmillan wrote: “Among the Germans who surrendered were approximately 40,000 civilians, including their wives and children. These were naturally demanded by the Russian commander, and we had no choice but to hand them over. Indeed, if we had refused to do so, there would have been no way to deal with them. However, the lack of any other option was a great source of regret for me. In exchange, we at least recovered approximately 2,000 British prisoners and wounded who were in the area and in German hands.”[16]
On May 14, 1945, General Keightley, commander of the 5th Corps, wrote to Field Marshal Harold Alexander, commander of the Allied 15th Army Group: “On recommendation, Macmillan today suggested to the Soviet General at Tolbukhin’s headquarters that the Cossacks and Caucasians be returned to the Soviets as soon as possible. He said that I had no authority to do this without your approval, but that he would be pleased to know Tolbukhin’s views and, if they coincided with mine, to ask you officially. There is no point in holding these large numbers of Soviet citizens, who are clearly a major source of friction between the Soviets and us.” [17]
On the same day, a directive was issued to the personnel of the 5th Buffs Battalion. This “Top Secret” order stated that it was estimated that 90% of the approximately 3,500 Caucasians, including women and children, held in camps in the Oberdrauburg-Dellach area would likely put up fierce resistance to forced repatriation, and warned that precautions should be taken against escape attempts.
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In the camps in Drau, the real struggle began on the morning of May 29. When news of the forced repatriation operation reached the camps, some refugees dug their own graves, climbed inside, and began a hunger strike. Reports indicated that 30 people had escaped from the Caucasian camp that night.[21] Representatives of the Caucasian refugees submitted a petition addressed to the British command to British officers. The petition read as follows:
To the honored English Commandant in Dellach.
From the Caucasian refugees, women, children, and priests :
We, Caucasian refugees, Kabardiner, Balkaren, Osetten, Tscherkessen, Karatscheier, Adygeer, and Abkhasier, who are in danger of being sent to the terrible Russian concentration Camps wish to say this For the last 25 years we have had no place to stay in Russia, we have had to go from one place to another, hungry and cold, with our old men, women, and children; if you now have any pity for these peoples do not send them back to Russia which is certain death for them. We, civilians, have had nothing to do with the Waffen S.S. Group, and from the first we have had a committee for refugees. If our requests cannot be granted and you want to send all Caucasians to a concentration camp in Russia, then please shoot us all here in the fields yourselves. We will obey all your orders if you do not send us back to Russia, We beg you to send us to a land controlled by the English and where our fellow refugees are.[22]
THE COMPANY COMMANDER STRUCK THE HEAD OF ONE OF THE RESISTERS WITH A SHOVEL, CRUSHING HIS SKULL. THE COMPANY COMMANDER SAID THAT "THIS BROUGHT THE CROWD TO ITS SENSES!"
On May 30, the “C” company of the 5th Buffs battalion was sent to the camp in Gröfelhof, where the refugees were located, to take the group of Kabardian Circassians to the Dellach station.[23] Company commander Major B. McGrath had previously told the refugees to be ready by 2:00 p.m., but when they arrived at the camp, he saw that the necessary preparations for the journey had not been made. A group of 200 men, women, and children had gathered beside the path leading to the main road and formed a circle. They opened a black flag and sang dirges. The British commander requested four three-ton trucks and, with the help of twenty soldiers, managed to load the refugees onto the vehicles with great difficulty. The refugees preferred to be executed by British soldiers on the spot rather than be handed over to the Soviets. Some of the people who were loaded onto the vehicles with great difficulty tried to escape by jumping out of the vehicles. While trying to force the people who were identified as the leaders of the action onto the truck, the British company commander and four of his men faced fierce resistance, and the company commander struck the head of one of the resisters with a shovel, crushing his skull. The company commander said that "this brought the crowd to its senses!” After this incident, the besieged crowd agreed to board the vehicles within half an hour.[24] The loading of this first convoy of 1,785 men, women, and children onto the train was completed at around 10:00 the next morning. Forty-eight people from the first convoy escaped during the transport. In addition, 100 Karachays who were still waiting at the camp that same night also escaped.[25] The train that departed from Dellach arrived at the Judenburg station at 6:30 p.m. and the refugees were handed over to Soviet authorities. Another group of 1,424 Caucasian refugees, consisting of 951 men, 289 women, and 184 children, was sent to Judenburg the next day in the same manner.[26] Among the Soviet officials who received the refugees in Judenburg was a female officer, British Major G. Goode that when the convoys reached the Soviet Union, the high-ranking prisoners would be taken for “re-education,” while the low-ranking and non-commissioned refugees would be directed to construction work to rebuild Soviet cities destroyed in the war.[27]
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After the operation was completed, more than 100 fugitives who had been captured were handed over to Soviet authorities in Judenburg on June 7. Until the end of June, many Caucasian fugitives managed to escape capture by constantly changing their location during the chase between the fugitives and British soldiers in the region.[30] Due to the high river flow, only a very good swimmer could attempt this route for escape. The dense forests on the northern slopes, filled with tall trees, provided a great deal of cover for the fugitives. According to some witness statements, some British soldiers who disobeyed their superiors' orders turned a blind eye to the fugitives, and some even provided them with directions. Of course, such isolated incidents could not serve as an excuse for the British Government to evade responsibility for the war crimes committed in the Drau Valley in the spring of 1945.[31]
Cem Kumuk
Istanbul, June 5, 2025
[1] TNA, Evacuation of Cossack and Cuacasian forces from 36 Infantry Brigade Area May-June 1945, WO 204/10449, L.1.
[2] ibid, 78. Div. Main HQ, Confidential - PW and Surrendered personnel, 198/27/G., 19.05.1945, WO 204/10449.
[3] ibid, 5th Battalion, Buffs: H.Q., War Diaries, 6 - 26 May 1945, WO 170/4993, L.8.
[4] ibid, Evacuation of Cossack and Cuacasian forces from 36 Infantry Brigade Area, May - June 1945, 108/G., WO 204/10449.
[5] ibid, Definition of Russian Nationals, 5 Corps Main HQ, 405/G., 21.05.1945, WO 204/10449
[6] Nicholas Bethell, The Last Secret, Londra, 1974, s.44, 231, 233
[7] TNA, Repatriation (Code 91(F)): Disposal of prisoners of Russian nationality captured while serving with German armed forces, WO 32/11137.
[8] ibid, WO 32/11137.
[9] Bethell,The Last Secret, p.29, 267.
[10] Tolstoy, Victims of Yalta, p.411.
[11] TNA, WO 32/11137, L.302A.
[12] ibid, WO 32/11137, L. 295A.
[13] ibid, WO 32/11137, L. 62C.
[14] ibid, Repatriation of Soviet citizens from abroad. Code 38 File 409, FO 371/47897, L.40.
[15] Epstein, Operation Keelhaul, p.23.
[16] Tolstoy, Victims of Yalta, p.276.
[17] ibid, p.272.
[18] TNA, Order for repatriation of the Caucasians on 28 May 1945, 27.05.1945, WO 170/4993, L.1-2.
[19] TNA, Evacuation of Cossack and Caucasian Forces from 36. Infantry Brigade Area May-June 1945, Report No.103/G, WO 204/10449, p.4.
[20] ibid, 36th. Infantry Brigade war diary, 28.05.1945, WO 170/4461, L.20; TNA, 5th Battalion, Buffs: H.Q., War Diaries, 6 - 26 May 1945, WO 170/4993, L.14.
[21] ibid, Message from 36 Inf. Bde., 301250B, 30.05.1945, WO 170-4461.
[22] ibid, Petition of North Caucasians to the commander of 5. Buffs, 29.05.1945, WO 204/10449, Appendix “G”.
[23] ibid, 5 Buffs Operational Order. No.9, 29.05.1945, WO 170/4993.
[24] ibid, Extract of statement by Major B.McGrath, OC “D” Coy Buffs, regarding Collection of Caucasians, 30.05.1945, WO 204/10449, Appendix “J”.
[25] ibid, Message From 36 Inf. Bde., 317xxB, 31.05.1945.
[26] ibid, Evacuation of Caucasians from Dellach, 31.05.1945, WO 204/10449, L.6.; message from 36 Inf. Bde, 01.05.1945, WO 170/4461.
[27] ibid, Extract from statement by Major G. Goode, 56 Recce Regiment, OC Armd Car Escort to Judenburg, 29.05.1945, Appendix “E”.
[28] ibid, Statement of holdings amd evacuations of Cossacks and Caucasians 27 May - 1 Jul, WO 204/10449, Appendix “P”.
[29] ibid, Intelligence Summary 5 Buffs, Escaping of surrendered personnel Caucasian division, 31.05.1945, WO 170/4993.
[30] ibid, Messages from 36 Inf. Bde., 1-15.06.1945, WO 170/4461; 5 Buffs War Diary, June 1945, WO 170/4993.
[31] Naumenko,Velikoe Predatelstvo, T.2, p.91.