Türkçe TercümeWhile the world was struck by the shock waves of the peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which was signed yesterday, August 9, 2025, in the US, today on Historical Memory of the North Caucasus, I share with you an interesting report by the French High Military Commissioner in the region after World War I regarding the Zangezur Corridor, an important part of that agreement;
The Zangezur District: A Region of Controversy Between Armenians and Tatar Muslims
The Zangezur region is located north of the Araxes River, extending from Agdam in the north to Goris in the south. The Akera Valley and its tributaries supply it with water. Both the Armenian and Tatar governments claim the region, except for its outermost borders, where ethnic Armenian and ethnic Tatar groups are in the majority. The entire central region has a heterogeneous population of peasants and villagers whose ethnic makeup is difficult to define. It can be assumed, however, that the villages are predominantly Tatar, especially along the Agdam-Goris road, and that the countryside is generally Armenian in the western and southern districts. Armenian and Tatar peasants, accustomed to living and working together for years under the same masters, live in harmony. Agitators—Turks from the former Ottoman army and Armenians from the national committees, servants of the idea of a greater Armenia—have pitted elements already separated by race against each other.
The Current Situation in The Zangezur Region;
1)From Agdam to Goris, along the road that runs through the Kayabashi and Yagli-Tepe valleys, the land is divided into zones under the control of different authorities that obey opposing directives.
2)The government of Azerbaijan has extended its effective authority as far as Agdam, the last exclusively Muslim city. It has occupied the region with its troops. Beyond Agdam, Tatar domination extends while diminishing to the west of the Agdam-Djebrail road.
3) Between Agdam and Shusha, where one begins to encounter denser Armenian populations, Tatar authority virtually ceases to exist. Shusha is a town that is both Armenian and Tatar. Ethnic conflicts were only definitively averted through the effective mediation of British troops. At the end of 1918, Shusha was the target of Armenian General Andranik's actions. The British settled in the area, maintaining order with a few local offices and soldiers.
4)South of Shusha, on the road to Goris, only Tatar villages are visible. Andranik reached this area, marking his passage with looting and the destruction of towns such as Abdallar and Zaboukh. The British could only imperfectly restore traffic between Shusha and Goris.
5)Goris is the center and capital of a fully Armenian region. An Armenian national committee was established there to fulfill the functions of intellectual and military propagandists.
The Zangezur region was truly the battlefield on which Armenia deployed its most vital forces. General Andranik has a small army of a few thousand disciplined and well-supplied men, and his character and authority are enormous. He is feared throughout the district. The Tatars have suffered atrocities at the hands of the Armenians. Far from pursuing a policy of entente, the Armenian national committees knowingly allowed more than 40 Tatar villages to be destroyed. Their members witnessed the looting and benefited from it. When Andranik received the Allies' order to cease hostilities and sent a letter to the Armenian National Council of Katar informing them of the decision, the council concealed the order for three weeks while waiting for the looting of the claimed villages to end.
For the moment, it seems that neither the Armenians nor the Tatars are in a position to administer the Zangezur district. Given this situation, the Allies appear to be the most qualified to establish effective order through their moral and material authority. According to Colonel Chardingny's informant, General Andranik should leave the region because he is seen as the real enemy by the Muslims.
I would also like to share with you a striking example of past reconciliation efforts involving Armenian politicians and their negative impact on the concept of Caucasian unity. This document reveals the contradictory attitudes and behavior of Armenian politicians regarding Caucasian unity and Armenian ideals for a Greater Armenia at the meeting on May 15, 1921, the meeting of Caucasian politicians in exile following the Bolshevik occupation of the Caucasus, to form a Union Government;
Joint meeting of the Representatives of the Caucasian Republics, May 15, 1921.
Presided over by: E.P. Gegechkori.
Present:
Representatives of:
AZERBAIJAN: A.M. Topchibashev, A.A. Sheikhul Islamov, Dj.b. Hadzhibekov, and M. Muharramov.
ARMENIA: A.A. Aharonian, A.I. Khatisov, and [Vagan] Papazian.
GEORGIA: N.S. Chkheidze, N.V. Ramishvili, K.B. Sabakhtorashvili, M.A. Sumbatov, S. Mdivani, and Veshaneli.
NORTH CAUCASUS: A.M.b. Chermoev.
Secretary: A.b. Atamalibekov.
Chairman [Evgeni Gegechkori]: Today's meeting is a continuation of the previous two, the last of which was attended by representatives of all four Caucasian peoples. The outcome of these meetings is as follows: everyone agreed that forming an alliance among the Caucasian peoples was not only timely but also essential. However, some participants had reservations, essentially arguing that this alliance should be based on principles that prevent increased repression of the local population by those who currently dominate the Caucasus. It was pointed out that we must learn from past mistakes to avoid the opposite of unification. The previous meeting was postponed because the Armenian delegation stated that they had not yet reached an agreement among themselves or with the delegation of Turkish Armenians and had not clarified their position on the matter. The alliance's foundations are set out in Ali Mardan Topchibashev's theses. I believe it is unnecessary to specify these points. As I said before, everyone recognized the need for this union in principle, but there were reservations about its maturity, and then the question of Turkish Armenia was raised. Since the meeting was postponed due to the Armenian delegation's statement that they needed to discuss it first, it is now up to the Armenian representatives. What have they decided?
Avetis Aharonian: In recent days, we have discussed this with the Delegation of Turkish Armenians. Additionally, we sent a telegram to our government regarding this matter, as it is too important to ignore, even though our government is currently in Tabriz. There has been no response yet since telegrams take a long time to arrive. This is, of course, an official, formal country.
When forming a union, we must avoid repeating the mistakes made under the Transcaucasian Sejm. The peoples' allegiances were different at that time. The Armenians were drawn to the Entente, the Azeris to the Turks, and Georgia had not defined its orientation. In these differing orientations of Armenia and Azerbaijan, the question of Turkish Armenia played an important role. I do not wish to dwell on the past. It seems to us that resolving the Turkish-Armenian conflict could eliminate friction. The sooner it is resolved, the better. We are indifferent to how the question is resolved—through a federation, the Entente, etc.—as long as it is resolved. After talking with the Delegation of Turkish Armenians, we decided that we cannot refuse to resolve the Turkish-Armenian question, especially since we signed the Treaty of Sèvres. We cannot divide the Armenian question. Therefore, we cannot conclude an alliance, which we also consider to be a form of salvation and to which we have agreed in principle, without prior guarantees that the issue of Turkish Armenia will be resolved. If you cannot wait for this issue to be resolved and wish to conclude this alliance without us, we ask that you leave a place for us in the alliance. While we do not doubt Mr. Chermoev's account of the Turkish representatives' statements and promises, we would like to receive guarantees directly from them. We are confident that our conversation with the Turkish leaders will lead to that result. Therefore, we need time so that we can talk with the Turks and come to an agreement.
Ali Mardan Topchibashev: We heard what Avetis Aharonian just said last time. Of course, questions of principle are important, but sometimes a principled decision is not enough. This is precisely our situation; for us, delay is fatal. Based on what Aharonian said, we can conclude that our union will almost never exist. We cannot help but note the formal instruction regarding the telegram to the Armenian government. The response to this telegram may come when it is too late to do anything. On the other hand, the Armenian delegation raises the question of guarantees. If these guarantees are requested from us—Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the North Caucasus—then we cannot provide any, as resolving this issue is beyond our capabilities. What position are we in? The Armenian delegation refers to the Treaty of Sèvres, which was condemned by those who signed it. However, they have this treaty, while we have nothing. The Armenian Delegation's statement that they agree in principle but cannot commit now does not resolve the issue. I believe the only correct position is to proceed from our immediate interests, especially given our current situation. Otherwise, we will end up in a vicious circle from which we will never be able to escape, as there is no end to extraneous considerations. During the discussion, various considerations were brought forward, such as the idea that this union would be a buffer state between Russia and Turkey and that it would be in Turkey's interest. It seems to me that we cannot and should not base the formation of the union on such considerations. We do not want to be a buffer, a pawn, or anything else in anyone's interest.
Having separated from Russia, we can only achieve stability in the future by uniting. There are two possibilities: either we have faith in this and join the union, or we have no faith in ourselves and rely on external forces, such as the Treaty of Sèvres. In that case, everyone will go their own way. There is no reason to believe that, in such a situation, we will receive help when it hasn't been given to us in three years. We will only receive help when they reckon with us. This will be a union, a confederation, or some other united organism. All extraneous considerations must be disregarded now. Our neighbors should not think that we are proposing they abandon all their concerns and join the union. However, I believe this step will better ensure our interests and, more importantly, Armenia's interests. Of course, we cannot guarantee a solution to an issue that has not yet been resolved by the council of powers, but we are confident that the best and fastest solution will be found in this union.
In his speech, Aharonian took a detour into the past and spoke about those who are at fault. However, I do not know who is more at fault, and if you put it on the scale, it is unclear who would outweigh the other.
Based on what the Armenian delegation declared, it seems that their participation in our union is difficult for the time being. We must regret this, and of course, there can be no talk of leaving a place for Armenia. We have always made room for Armenia, even when the union between Georgia and Azerbaijan was established. However, Armenia did not join. I hope it will be different in the future and that you will soon take your rightful place as one of the peoples of the Caucasus.
Abdul Medjid Chermoy[ev]: The last time, I drew attention to the question of whether the Armenian delegation would defend the principles of the Treaty of Sèvres. I think this desire remains. The Delegation of Turkish Armenians has no objections to the conclusion of the union. Sending a telegram to the Armenian government is more a matter of delicacy, especially since the Armenian representatives said they have directives regarding rapprochement with neighboring peoples. Thus, it would seem that all the necessary information is available. However, I will ask again. If the Armenian delegation is considering prioritizing the principles of the Treaty of Sèvres, it will be a huge setback for them. From this point of view, I believe the Armenian delegation should reconsider the union and view it as an end rather than a means to an end. We cannot come to the forthcoming conference without first preparing public opinion in England, France, Italy, and other countries. This takes time; otherwise, it will all be useless work. If the Armenians join the union, every just national aspiration, even outside the territories of the Caucasus, will be heeded. Besides, in the union, we will have a better chance of being heard than if we were to act individually. Therefore, I believe it would be better to discuss this again, and the Armenian representatives should reconsider.
Noe Ramishvili: If we support creating a union, it is because three years of history have proven to us that unity is our salvation. As soon as we departed from this path, we were threatened with destruction. The North Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia gradually fell because they lacked unity. Now, the interests of us all require this union. We do not call it a confederation, but rather a union of independent states. There is no disagreement on the Armenian question. We are all interested in resolving it, not based on what Europe says about it, but based on our own interests. For us, the issue is clear and settled. First and foremost, Armenia itself is interested in this. There is little hope that the conference of diplomats will resolve this issue. If attitudes toward Poland change as well, as indicated by Lloyd George's latest speech, then there is even less reason to hope that the Entente will address the Armenian question. This means that we need to arrange things ourselves. By proclaiming the 1914 borders, we have established that no state can claim this territory. This is an advantage for Georgia and even more so for Armenia. This means that we are already winning. Otherwise, several questions will arise: What about Kars? Should we give it to Turkey? In general, the question may arise that the Caucasus should be managed by the Turks. Not to mention, the customs issue that has caused us so much trouble is being resolved — customs are being abolished. The issue of Turkish Armenia remains.
From this point of view, I don't understand why Turkish Armenian representatives would be against the union. The Caucasian states are speaking out on this issue, declaring that a resolution is needed. They are telling the European states, "Help us determine Turkey's attitude so that we can form our union." If we make such a statement, it will be significant, and our voice will be heard. I think acting separately will not benefit us at all. That is why I believe such a formulation of the question must be accepted.
Abdul Medjid Chermoy[ev]: I would like to ask one question. The Armenian delegation cannot agree for formal or real, substantial reasons. If the latter, going to the conference with the Treaty of Sèvres is like going into battle with a rusty old dagger, while the Caucasian Union represents an improved, rapid-fire weapon.
Avetis Aharonyan: They want to convince us that the confederation is useful, but we already know this. The idea of the union is clear to us, and the need for unity has been proven throughout history. We are told that the Treaty of Sèvres is discredited. Of course, this is true, and we reject it. But what do we get in return? It would be naive to think that, in the current international situation, we have any hope with the Entente, Europe, etc. It seems to you that, instead of the Treaty of Sèvres, you are giving us an improved Mauser. However, this does not seem so to us. We don't even have a promise from Turkey regarding our issue. Until we have a common Caucasian orientation, nothing will come of it. This will happen when this sore point is resolved. Therefore, we posed our question as a pan-Caucasian one.
Vagan Papazian: As a member of the Armenian delegation and a Turkish Armenian, I consider myself familiar with the psychology of Turkish Armenians regarding this matter. Avestis Aharonian sincerely said that one must believe in the necessity of uniting the Caucasian peoples, and we believe it. However, there are many reasons hindering us today. The main one is the issue of Turkish Armenia. We demand an integral Armenia. Can you accept us into the union in this form, i.e., as an integral Armenia? It seems to me that you cannot. We are not talking about the old, wide borders. Our demands are minimal. If you accept a united Armenia into the union, then the union will be directed against Turkey. Clearly, Russia will be hostile. However, it is impossible to create enemies on both sides simultaneously. You cannot demand Turkish territory and expect the Turkish Armenians to agree to the entry of only part of Armenia into the union. We have long been disillusioned with the Entente, but internal reasons play a role in this matter. Disagreements could arise between the Caucasian and Turkish Armenians, which would divide us. An agreement must be reached between the Russian and Turkish Armenians. While we fundamentally agree with you on the necessity of an alliance, we must temporarily remain outside of it, reserving our place to join at the first opportunity.
Noe Ramishvili: I would like to ask a question. If we create an alliance and announce it, would you be willing to issue a statement acknowledging that you are facing certain difficulties and that, once they are resolved, you will also join the alliance?
Vagan Papazian: Of course. Regarding a favorable resolution of our difficulties, your assistance would be very useful.
Muhammad Muharramov: From what we have heard, the Armenian Delegation has no fundamental objections, but the issue of Turkish Armenia poses an obstacle to Armenia's entry. into the union. This is the point at which we disagree with the Armenian Delegation. We believe that the union will be instrumental in resolving the Turkish-Armenian question. Without a union, there will be no resolution. If this union is created, it will be a major force that can influence a favorable resolution. The Armenian delegation does not share this view. Of course, the Treaty of Sèvres is a guarantee for the Armenians. Especially when considering that, based on my observations of political trends, there is a growing belief in England that creating a barrier state in the form of one Armenia is sufficient. The separation of the Caucasus is deemed too difficult and too sensitive to Russia. Therefore, we can limit ourselves to creating one Armenia. If we adhere to this trend, joining the union would be against Armenia's interests. However, I believe an independent Armenia could exist under Russia's protection or as part of a union with the Caucasus. The question is: What is more valuable? While joining the union may weaken the guarantee of the Treaty of Sèvres, the union is a new force that provides new and better opportunities for resolving the Armenian question.
Alexander Khatisov: First of all, we would be very interested in hearing from Mr. Mdivani, who is here with us today. We have received letters and newspapers containing his interview, in which the name of the Georgian envoy to Ankara is mentioned. We could learn from him how they feel about the confederation and other issues. I would like to emphasize once again what we said at the last meeting. The Turkish Armenians' point of view is not to adhere strictly to the letter of the Treaty of Sèvres. However, without resolving the issue of Turkish Armenia, they cannot join the union. Mikhail Papadjanov shares this opinion. As you know, he is one of the most ardent supporters of unifying the Caucasian peoples. He believes that if the union is formed, only the Russian Armenians can join, and the Turkish Armenians must remain outside until their issue is resolved. Clearly, if a fourth member must join this union, we must advance the issue of Turkish Armenia more forcefully. There is no hope that Turkey will resolve this issue in any way. In his conversations with me and others, Bekir Sami Bey said nothing substantial in this regard. We are now in the creative process regarding the union. One signature is not enough. To create this union, we need to establish its reality and viability.
Regarding the three Caucasian states, all their issues begin and end within Russia's borders. The Armenian question has two roots: Russia and Turkey. From a political point of view, this is its advantage. As Mr. Papazian said, Turkish and Russian Armenians engage in polemics at the slightest provocation. Turkish Armenians tell us that their issue has existed for 60 years, while ours only appeared three years ago. Therefore, the Turkish-Armenian issue will be resolved one way or another, and the Armenian Republic may end up as the Yerevan province. They say that Russian Armenians can join the union, but Turkish Armenians can only do so when their issue is resolved. For us to separate would mean dividing the Armenian question into two parts, thus violating the instruction to act jointly. The situation of the other three Caucasian republics is different. You are ready to join the union, and we will not consider this incorrect; we did not expect it. We will work to resolve our difficulties in joining the union, and we are confident that you will do the same.
Simon Mdivani: First, the interview with me that appeared in the "Voice of the People" newspaper is completely inaccurate. I have not met anyone from this newspaper. A "Dzhagadamara" employee talked to me and promised to show me the text before printing anything. Since this was not done, and the interview was distorted, I was forced to publish it in the newspapers. During the interview, I only spoke of my personal impressions. The question of confederations is of interest to Angora as well as to us.
Chairman [Evgeni Gegechkori]: I believe the debate has run its course. We need to resolve this issue. We have two options. We can either conclude that without Armenia, our union is so diminished that it makes no sense to continue, or we can move forward together. We will discuss these options and make a decision.
Noe Ramishvili: Perhaps a third solution is to make a statement that we have such a project, but encounter obstacles in implementing it. Therefore, we ask the powers to assist us in finding favorable solutions to our difficult questions.
Chairman [Evgeni Gegechkori]: All arguments have been exhausted. I would like to emphasize one point once again. The Armenian Delegation's statement implies that their issue is unique and that the question of an alliance has been resolved for everyone except Abdul Medjid Chermoy[ev]. However, it seems that, except for Abdul Medjid Chermoy[ev], the question has not been resolved for anyone; it is still only a question. We have two enemies: Russia, which has objective interests, and Turkey, which will be guided by immediate interests, losing sight of the future.
Due to the Armenian Delegation's definitive statement, today's meeting must conclude with the acknowledgment that additional meetings may follow. We will also discuss the current situation and Noe Ramishvili's proposal among ourselves, since we have not yet discussed them.
The meeting is now closed.
We will see if the treaty signed yesterday in the U.S. heals the chronic wounds in the Caucasus or triggers others. This agreement puts a damper on some major players in the region, including Iran, Russia, and China. The region is ripe for critical developments.
Attention! Tension in the North Caucasus may rise again.
Cem Kumuk
Istanbul, 10 August 2025