The Truth About Said Shamil in the Light of Archival Documents, Part 3

  • 14/09/2023
 

Emergence of Poles in the Anti-Soviet activities and Said Shamil’s relations with them.

Not long after the French cut off financial support, Said Shamil found himself a new strategic partner. In an OGPU report dated August 25, 1923, it was emphasized that the Poles focused on the Caucasus and that since June 1923, a project has been carried out through the Polish ambassador to Istanbul to bring North Caucasian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian politicians together. One of the Poles’ allies among the highlanders was Said Shamil.[1]

“Information note "Polish work on the Channel", compiled by the White Guard intelligence organization in Istanbul, regarding the creation in the mentioned city of the Joint Committee of the Confederates of the Caucasus, intercepted by the IPO OGPU ZSFSR
August 25, 1925
Top secret

Recently, the desire of the Poles to establish quite seriously their intelligence and political work in the Caucasus and Transcaucasia has become quite clear and has resulted in concrete forms. Negotiations on this matter began more than two months ago. Their initiative came from the Polish envoy in Constantinople. His closest intermediary in this case was a certain correspondent of the “Rzeczpospolita” Petrusso-Petrushevsky (Nane St., 18).
Negotiations were started with Dr. Sultanov, who is a well-known religious leader of Azerbaijan, a former socialist, now greatly improved. A man who enjoyed great authority in Azerbaijan in general, and in Karabakh in particular, where he and his brother fought for a long time against Bolshevism and created a name and fame for themselves. Sultanov’s rarest quality is honesty, which in itself creates for him even greater prestige and superiority over other figures in the Caucasus.
The Polish envoy suggested that Sultanov create a well-known group of representatives of various Caucasian nationalities standing on the platform of independence of their peoples. During the negotiations, he emphasized that he is a socialist, that the Polish government is now leftist, that it stands for the point of view of self-determination of peoples, and so on. Therefore, he has the authority from his representative office to unite several Caucasian nationalities and provide them with support in their struggle for their independence and against the Bolsheviks. The factual side of the issue, of course, is that the Poles, as always, are now very afraid of an armed conflict with the Bolsheviks. To draw the attention of the Soviets away from their border and create a threat to them in the rear, in case of war, they sought to create unrest in the Caucasus by financing various counter-Bolshevik groups.
Since the Poles had some separate relations before with the same Sultanov, some groups, etc., the negotiations went quite successfully. A project was created to unite leaders of Azerbaijan, Georgians, and Mountaineers.
At first, Sultanov took a very broad approach in this regard. With his help and with the participation of Petrushevsky, quite a lot of people of quite varied dignity were designated for the unification: Sultanov and his brother from Azerbaijan, Shamil from Dagestan, to which it was supposed to be added: Kotsev, the former chairman of the government of the Mountain Republic, Ahmed Khan Miserbiev, their former minister finances of Dzhabagiev and others. Sunzhev, who enjoyed great influence there, was appointed from Kabarda, but the latter flatly refused to participate in the group that included Miserbiev and Kotsev, their company. Things did not go well with the Georgians for some time, since their representative here, Vachnadze, had previously had such relations with the Poles and managed to earn an unfavorable opinion there. In addition, here we encountered the official representative of the former Georgian government, Mdivani, who created many obstacles, as a result of which the Georgians almost quarreled among themselves.
During all these negotiations, Nuri Pasha (Enver Pasha’s brother) quite actively joined the matter, and, together with Sultanov, tried to reconcile some people among themselves, especially among the highlanders, where the mood was especially irreconcilable.
It should also be added that a military agent of the Polish embassy intervened in these same negotiations and quite resolutely rebelled against the participation of Miserbiev and his company in the case.
Thus, the period of these negotiations turned out to be quite confusing. But at this time the situation has already been determined with a certain clarity. It boils down to this:
Sultanov and his small group (his brother, Shamil, Alihan Kantemir, and some others) came to an agreement with the Georgians through Asatiani, who had recently arrived here. On the Georgian side, only the active part of the group of national democrats entered. Mdivani does not take part...
It was Sultanov, as such, who received a loan of 3,000 Liras from the Polish envoy, with which he began work about 20 days ago. The plans of this group boil down to organizing work points in Kars and Ardahan, and from there operating in the Caucasus for intelligence and political purposes. About 20 days ago Alihan Kantemir went to Kars, and yesterday, August 26, Vachnadze went there too, who is thinking of organizing his work in both Kars and Ardahan. There, on the spot, Alihan Kantemir will inevitably contact a certain Hadzhi Mirza Shanaev, a rather empty person, who has lived in Kars for a long time, is engaged in commerce there, and has many acquaintances in a wide variety of circles. In Ardahan, this group expects to work through a certain Kabardian Jelal Bey, who went there about three and a half months ago. But this person is unreliable, here he is connected with Miserbiev, so working with him will force him to work with the latter. In addition, Jalal Bey will be placed in a rather tight framework of work by some people who are around him and do not completely share his views.
Here another, still very confusing, question arises: there is a certain Ismail Bey here. The man is empty in every way. Very peculiar concepts of honesty. This gentleman belongs to the socialist group of Musavatists and is a supporter of Rasulzade, who is working strongly against Sultanov. Ismailbey is currently living with Sultanov at his expense and serves as an observer for Rasulazade. This Ismail Bey managed to enter the Turkish police, to the head of the 1st section, Aziz Hudayi Bey, offering him all kinds of information allegedly received from all anti-Bolshevik organizations. After that, he contacted Miserbiev and others and continued to intensively negotiate with the military agent of the Poles, through the same Petrushevsky, offering the Poles the organization of intelligence work, both in the Caucasus and here locally.
The military agent is negotiating because having arrived here after Babitsky, he found the agency in a rather deplorable state and is trying to recreate it.
Ismail’s connection with the police, the presence of many very dubious people around him, his own unscrupulousness, and the possibility of him receiving some funds from the Poles (if his negotiations are successful) can make him a rather unpleasant and harmful person, like his entire group.
As for the first group, there is a serious hope that their work will not go unnoticed by us.”

After the preparatory works, which lasted for about a year, towards the end of 1924, it was decided to establish a formation called the «The Union for Liberation of The Caucasus» in Istanbul with the initiative of the Polish ambassador Roman Knoll. Said Shamil was one of the most important building blocks of this union. He had established a strong friendship with Colonel Tadeusz Schaetzel, the military attaché of the Polish embassy in Ankara. He tried to impress the Poles by conveying ordinary information from the Caucasus as if it were of critical intelligence value[2];

“February 5, 1926
[Constantinople]
Dear Colonel,

I received your letter dated 1/2/1926. I am, without a doubt, saddened by the case of our young officers. But, believing that at the first opportunity, your promise will be fulfilled, I feel happy.
As I informed you in my letter of January 25, I have taken all measures and the day after tomorrow, that is, on Monday, I am leaving for Trebizond on Bakir’s ship.
This week I received news from the country. This is a response to a letter I sent three months ago.
This news indicates a great national movement, which is expanding every day, even extending to the press and other Bolshevik institutions. Recently the Bolsheviks sentenced to death almost 800 people who were arrested by them. Of these, Nejmeddin, Esther Ali, Majid, and others are known.
Among these convicts, there were truly valuable people.
Upon my return, I will tell you all the news regarding the country.
In the meantime, please accept, dear Colonel, my most friendly greetings.
Shamil”

The difference between the intelligence capabilities of the Soviets and those of the anti-Soviet forces was quite striking. While the Soviets were able to follow every single movement of the opposition groups and be aware of everything, Polish diplomats were processing the out-of-date information they received from Said Shamil as if it was instant intelligence information;[3]

“March 9, 1926
Dear Colonel,
I have the honor to inform you that today, despite all the difficulties, our business has taken a rather orderly and favorable turn.
1.During my journey I established a center in Trebizond, connected with Batum and Tiflis. People located in these cities will easily provide me with communications, as well as their own business affairs.
They worked with me during my Caucasian campaign, and will continue to work for the benefit of their homeland without any personal interest, but only if the expenses incurred by them for all these matters are paid by me.
2.Since sending people through the mountains during winter is very dangerous, I abandoned this idea and sent an old, very energetic emigrant who knew the country well. I had to ensure his crossing of the border with the help of a visa from the Soviet consulate in Trebizond, and I gave him all the necessary instructions. As soon as he comes into contact with my friends, they will all start activities in the mountains and, in addition, I have prepared another person who will take care of his passport. He will set out these days as soon as I warn him to join the first, and in one or two months he will come to give me information regarding matters.
With the help of the passport of the Soviet consulate in Trebizond, we, through couriers, are almost completely guaranteed to receive our very important information. For Hopa, at present, my old and influential friend is enough. We take upon ourselves the task of sending those people who are not able to obtain their visas to the country in the summer using other means.
According to the information received:
Ahmed Khan [Miserbiev] is currently in the country. He got to work, and I have now received telegrams. I don't know to what extent it will be serious. At the same time, as a precautionary measure, I ordered my friends to be careful. As a result of my activities, one of the delegates came to see me from the mountains in Hopa. I told him to come see me in May. If this is not possible, I will go to see him myself and discuss with him in detail all the necessary news. Along with this, I received a telegram from the country with the message that I would soon also have quite detailed information. After receiving the reports and meeting with the delegates, I will come to you to explain the situation. In the meantime, I'll let you know some little news that might interest you.
The economic situation in the North Caucasus is generally good. Peasants are under pressure. Products are available in abundance. A pound of bread costs 12-14 kopecks, sugar - 30-35 kopecks, and there is also plenty of livestock.
As a result of the lack of exports and imports, there is a huge shortage of clothing, construction materials, and agricultural machinery.
Regarding the political situation:
The Soviet government kept Dagestan completely separate from the entire Caucasus.
With the help of several means of propaganda and congresses, as well as with the help of the press, it worked hard to expand the party organization, wanting the Caucasian fortress to become one of the centers of the Soviet spirit.
The following number of members of the Soviet party in the North Caucasus is known:

Dagestan: 3000 men, 2000 women.
Chechnya: 100 men, no women.
In Circassia and Kabarda this figure is almost zero.
In Ossetia: 600 men, 300 women.

In the Caucasus, only in Ossetia are there factories that are barely operating. Several industrial houses were also founded there.
There is discontent throughout the country. Even the majority of employees of Soviet institutions are not party members. Rural organizations are purely national. All efforts expended to make military service compulsory have yielded no results. The government had to abandon this idea through a proclamation.
A significant number of troops are concentrated in several places, and are distributed and deployed as follows:
In Kuban, Krasnodar, Maikop, Armavir, Batalpashinskaya, Pyatigorsk, Kislovodsk, Grozny and Vladikavkaz. Only in Dagestan, their number is very small.
Carrying weapons is prohibited, everything found was confiscated and, in connection with this, a large number of people were arrested and convicted, as I have already informed you about.
Police soldiers do not represent a serious force, although this time on behalf of the government of Dagestan it was announced the organization of a small army consisting of:

2 cavalry regiments;
1st Infantry Regiment;
1st Artillery Battalion.

All Highlander officers received an invitation to take command of their troops.
The most important role in the country is played by abreks: Due to winter and the current situation, most of the Dagestan abreks retreated and took refuge in the forests. Some of them also took refuge in Chechnya and a small part in Dzhengutai. Currently, they dominate in Dagestan. According to the information I received, abreks located in the regions of Chechnya, Kabarda, and Kuban are active and, from time to time, carry out attacks on Bolshevik centers and convoys.
I was informed that the population and abreks still retain courage and national pride, according to the orders I gave through the people I sent to them. I told them to attach great importance to maintaining a stable connection between these brave abreks and I hope that shortly I will be able to present you with a report regarding the organization and a detailed list.
Only the lack of the required amount forced us to think about bothering you.
Thank you for the amount that I received from "Mr. T" I hope that with the help of the incoming and outgoing courier, I will be able to help my friends with an amount that will make a good impression on them since I know very well that at the first meeting, the delegate will ask me to help them.
For this reason, I ask you to help me now as quickly as possible.
I went to meet the delegate. You can send me the amount with the help of my cousin Bereket.
Please accept, my dear Colonel, the assurances of my respect and esteem.
Shamil”

Said Shamil (standing on the left) with his cousins in Istanbul (Saadet, Mehmet Shamil, Melike, Hamza Osman, Habibe)
This situation would become even more stunning in the future. Said Shamil, in a letter to Colonel Schaetzel on April 21, 1927, took advantage of the Colonel’s lack of general knowledge, and proposed to form a Circassian Cavalry Detachment in Syria. Such a regiment had existed in Syria since 1922 and had been founded by Philibert Collet, one of the commanders of the French mandate administration. Said Shamil was bringing this to the attention of Colonel Schaetzel as if it had been a new project developed by himself;[4]

“April 21, 1927
Dear Colonel,
Hussein [Kumuz], after a slight delay, is ready to leave tomorrow.
I am hopeful for him. He is a very good worker and is quite ready to carry out everything that is entrusted to him. I am sure that he will always enjoy our patronage.
Once again I ask you, dear colonel, to keep him near you at the General Staff so that he has the opportunity to work and prepare himself for the future as a staff officer.
All external affairs are going well. The party organization is strengthening, propaganda and the press have already begun to operate, and mobilization in general is expanding.
We have a project about Syria. We have the opportunity to organize significant armed forces there, formed from new and old emigrants.
The French want this and have already begun to form squadrons, but they do not have serious people to distribute to all these units.
We will never want to enter into an adventure against Arabia. Our only desire is to take advantage of all these opportunities to organize a real force, the foundation of the future, and for this it is necessary to reach an agreement with the French.
You, dear Colonel, are well aware of our favorable situation - we have plenty of people, but we do not have the soil to discipline and train them.
As a result of our work inside the Caucasus, we are in the necessary preparatory state for further action.
The information received shows that significant forces of the Red Army were sent to us to conduct large-scale military exercises in the mountains. After capturing a large number of innocent people and removing them to Russia, the army, leaving Russian garrisons reinforced with cannons in such strategic fortresses as Gunib, Khunzakh, Botlikh, Vedeno, and Shatoi, returned.
But the issue of mobilization is not as I wrote to you before. It had not yet been carried out, and during the agitation by the army, the government carried out great propaganda among the people to attract them to military service.
The issue of mobilization was resolved at the communist congress, where it was stated that the mountaineers were asking Moscow to accept them for military service.
This caused a lot of noise and I don’t know how it will all end. In any case, the communists want to introduce it.
The most important aspect is the change in government policies compared to previous years. Since the extremists have been in power, there has been a strong and harsh agitation and a lot of work has been done to expand the Communist Party.
Judging by external signs, the number of its members is indeed increasing.
Thirdly, military roads are important. To give all the strategic passages to the mountains, we are preparing their description. These days I will send you a list of roads.
In the meantime, please accept, dear Colonel, my friendly wishes.
Shamil”

Said Shamil’s source of information in the North Caucasus was Ahmethan Miserbiev who signed his letters under the pseudonym «Nart». Apart from a literary work that he penned about the life of Sheikh Mansur which was published in Istanbul in 1924 in French, there is no complementary information about Miserbiev available in the archives.[5] He was one of those who disappeared in the depth of history like many other highlanders of the same era. Miserbiev in his letters to Said Shamil has offered to stop the politics and to take radical action in the North Caucasus as soon as possible.[6]

Miserbiev's work "The Life of Mansur" (You can access the e-copy of the book by clicking the link on the footnotes)
Such motivating letters have excited the Polish diplomats who were in contact with Said Shamil. During the trial of Najmudin of Gotsatl, one of the NKVD allegations against him was a letter said to be received from Said Shamil. He was blamed for reading that letter to the representatives of mountain auls of Chechnya on April 15, 1924, and tempting people for an uprising by promising that a large number of weapons would be coming from Said Shamil. However, there has been no evidence of such a letter in the Soviet archives. So it is highly probable that the allegation was purely a design of NKVD. On the other hand, this can be taken as a strong sign that the communists continued to make use of Said Shamil’s name against the local population for possible future malice.[7] 
Said Shamil was cooperating with the Polish in a scheme similar to a boss-employee relationship. He was trying to position himself above his compatriots by presenting himself as the only interlocutor of the Polish sponsors. For example, in a letter he wrote to Tadeusz Schaetzel on March 9, 1926, which he simply carbon-copied to the other leading members of the Caucasian émigré groups, he submitted the Polish diplomat a report on his trip to Trebizond. There, he reported that he had established an information center consisting of people he had been with during his days in the Caucasus, which would work in connection with other centers like Batumi and Tbilisi. He also stated that he had obtained passports and visas from the Soviet consulate in Trebizond for his agents who would go to the Caucasus. So, as emphasized earlier, it was not surprising that the Soviet Consulate in Trebizond knew all about Said Shamil’s activities and contacts in Turkey.
As a result of the pressures of the Poles who forced the Caucasian political émigré groups to work under a single roof as a center on the axis of Poland, the Caucasus Independence Committee (Комитет независимости Кавказа — КНК) was established in Istanbul on July 15, 1926. Said Shamil was also among the North Caucasian representatives together with Alihan Kantemir.[8]

The Appeal of the Independence Committee to the Council of Three in Paris dated August 1, 1926 (Click the link on the footnotes to access the original document)
Having the full support of the Poles, Said Shamil was trying to rule out other North Caucasian politicians by establishing hegemony in the KNK. Alihan Kantemir had been commissioned earlier for intelligence and propaganda work on the Soviet border with the decision of the Committee in March 1925. Later, Said Shamil claimed that Kantemir was spying for the Soviets during that duty, and initiated an investigation against Kantemir.[9]

The interrogation sheets on the question of Alihan Kantemir (Click the link on the footnotes to access the complete file)
He also claimed that some other Mountain intelligentsia from the Turkish immigration, such as Tambiy Elekhoti, Pshimaho Kotse (Kosok), Djemaleddin Musallayev, Muhammed Kotiev (Mehmet Ketey), Kumuk Aydibulov and Ali Malikov, were in contact with the Soviet intelligence as well.[10] As a result of these slanders made through anonymous reports, a commission established on August 19, 1926, within the Committee started to investigate the issue. The Commission was headed by one of the Azerbaijani national-democrats Halilbek Hasmemedov and the secretary was one of the liberals of the North Caucasian Highlanders, Pshemakho Kotse. 
The Commission first questioned Mehmed Emin Resulzade on September 4, 1926. Resulzade stated that he did not have direct information about the issue and that the information was conveyed to him by one of his reporters, Mehmed-Ali Hüseyinoğlu. Resulzade stated that he did not have direct information about the issue and that the information was conveyed to him by one of his reporters, Mehmed-Ali Hüseyinoğlu. The person who gave the information had reported that Alihan Kantemir was dealing with the Soviet foreign trade company Vneshtorg in Kars. This was exactly the task given to Kantemir by the Committee. Kantemir was assigned this task in the region by the Committee under the guise of a merchant to collect information.  The next person the Commission questioned was Said Shamil. The interrogation report dated February 26, 1927, left no room for any doubt about who had slandered Kantemir and Elekhoti. His testament was as follows:

“I have known Alihan Kantemir for a long time. He is one of the prominent political figures in the North Caucasus. Having observed Kantemir's political activities for many years, I must say that I did not notice a definite and clear line of behavior in him. It does not have, so to speak, a political character. At the beginning of the formation of the Caucasian republics, Kantemir actively worked among mountain politicians and independentists who fought against the Bolsheviks to consolidate the independence of the Mountain Republic. With the advent of the Denikin danger, he, together with some other comrades, changed the front, entered into an agreement with the local Bolsheviks, and together with them fought against Denikin. Such activities continued until the occupation of the Mountain and Azerbaijan Republics by the Bolsheviks. Remaining within the boundaries of these republics during the days of Bolshevik power, Kantemir lived freely either in Baku or in T. Shura. Having then been arrested by the Bolsheviks for some reason, he, however, sought release, obviously justifying himself by referring to his previous connections and relationships, and moved to Georgia. When the latter began to be threatened by the Bolsheviks, Kantemir again changed front and took an active part in the general struggle against them, launched to protect the independence of Georgia. After the Bolsheviks occupied Georgia, he moved to Turkey.
Living in Istanbul, Kantemir became close to his old friend Tambi Elikov [Elekhoti], who at that time was in the Bolshevik service in Vneshtorg. Living in the same apartment with him, he served at that time in T-ve Regis, receiving about 70 lire a month. This was in 1923–1924. Just at this time, Bolshevik agents Prasolov and Borisov arrived in Istanbul to promote the “return” of emigrants to Russia. Kantemir, Elikov [Elekhoti], and some others enter into relations with them and as a result establish a committee, on behalf of which they enter into negotiations with them. The committee manages to send a batch of mountain refugees from here to their homeland. At the same time, the committee expresses its readiness to Prasolov and others to help them develop this matter, but sets them some conditions, namely:
1) the eviction of all Cossacks from the Mountain Republic;
2) placing in their place not only refugees who left their homeland during the revolution but also former emigrants living in different countries, numbering about a million people; and
3) the formation of federations of mountain peoples within the Mountain Republic and its inclusion in the Caucasian Confederation.
If these conditions were accepted, the committee, for its part, promised to recognize Soviet power and promote the success of Bolshevism in those areas where mountain elements lived. The committee even submitted a written memorandum to the Bolsheviks on this matter. The Bolsheviks were very interested in this. In the end, they answered the committee that its conditions were acceptable and that there was only a difficulty regarding the issue of expelling the Cossacks, to resolve which it was necessary to hold a meeting. For this purpose, Kantemir and others were invited to come to Moscow. However, Kantemir and others did not dare to go to Moscow, fearing the Bolsheviks, and, to cover this up, they moved the committee to Paris, explaining that it was difficult to continue work in Istanbul because the Turks were watching them. In Paris, they established a committee of other people, and Kantemir and others, remaining on the sidelines, nevertheless continued to lead it, but I don’t know what its achievements are.
Mr. Dzhabagiev told me about the committee’s negotiations with the Bolsheviks and showed me an information letter he received from a member of the said committee, Mr. Namitokov. At the same time, I asked Kantemir about this, and he did not hide all this from me, declaring that this was supposedly required for the good of the homeland.
When I was in Prague, I learned from our highlander Murad Gotogy [Khatagogu] that Kantemir received from the Kuban from the Bolsheviks a certificate for free entry there. He showed me a letter from Kuban, which reported this information. This circumstance indicates that the committee still has relations with the Bolsheviks.
I don’t know whether the committee received any financial assistance from the Bolsheviks during the period when it was in Istanbul. Likewise, I don’t know whether any of the committee members individually, including Kantemir, received the same help from them, but I certify that during the period I indicated above, Tambi Elikov [Elekhoti] and Alihan Kantemir lived avowedly in Istanbul. I don’t know whether Kantemir had personal funds in addition to the salary he received from Twa Seyasi. I don’t know whether Kantemir took goods from Russo-Turco for commercial purposes when he went to Kars, but such rumors took place among the mountaineers. I don’t know whether he made acquaintance with Princess Abashidze, who turned out to be an agent of the Bolsheviks, but there was talk about this in the same environment, and Alihan himself did not hide this acquaintance, saying that it was.”

Alihan Kantemir in the late 1920s
Alihan Kantemir, who presented his plea on March 9, 1927, responded to the allegations as follows;

1) I am charged with a fictitious escape from the Bolsheviks.
2) Negotiations with them on behalf of the mountaineers.
3) Acquaintance with Princess Abashidze.
4) Acquaintance with Elekoev [Elekhoti], who served with the Bolsheviks.
5) Trade relations with the Bolsheviks in Kars.

I am answering the questions:

1) I lived for a short time in Dagestan under the Bolshevik regime. Two months after their arrival, I was arrested and, after spending one and a half months in T.Kh.Shurinsky prison was sent to the disposal of the Cheka in Moscow, I fled from the road. My further activities against the Bolsheviks during the Georgian war against them proved that I was far from the idea of ​​compromising with them.
2) While in exile in Istanbul, I was appointed diplomatic representative of our Paris government delegation and as such entered into relations and negotiations with all representatives of the powers. In the same capacity, he had a meeting with Bolshevik representatives, similar to those meetings that representatives of another Caucasian government had with the same Bolsheviks.
3) I knew Princess Abashidze, to whom I was introduced by my friend D. Vachnadze. However, I consider acquaintance with a woman, not a sufficient reason for it to influence my political credo and behavior. At the time of our acquaintance, and after, and now, I do not know about her involvement in Bolshevik agents.
4) I have also known Elekoev [Elekhoti] since my youth (gymnasium and St. Petersburg University). He was starving in Istanbul, suffered from scurvy, and at that time the former chairman of the Grozny Congress of Oil Industrialists, which consisted of Bolsheviks in the service in Istanbul as a specialist for the chief of Azneft, moreover, a man of right-wing convictions, a former close acquaintance of Elekoev [Elekhoti], suggested that the latter join the service in Azneft. Elekoev [Elekhoti] who was in an extreme state of hunger, asked my opinion, and I approved his entry into Azneft, from where, however, a year later, during the purge of the composition, he was expelled as a “bourgeois”.
5) I went to Kars on behalf of the Confederation Committee, but it was inconvenient to speak openly as a political emissary about the Caucasian issue in a city where friendly relations between Russia and Turkey were determined at a conference several years ago. I was surrounded by Soviet detective agents, trying to find out what I was doing. In this situation, I had no choice but to declare myself a businessman. And indeed, to mislead my enemies, I bought galoshes from them and sent two carloads of firewood to Alexandropol. The commercial gain was small, but it saved me from persecution. However, the Bolsheviks from Moscow began to protest in the person of Chicherin in front of Angora and the Minister of Internal Affairs of Turkey suggested that I temporarily leave Kars, which I did.
I add to the second point: I found the negotiations with the Bolsheviks pointless and after two meetings they were interrupted. There is no mountain emigrant committee, in which mountain political figures would participate and which allegedly still negotiates with the Bolsheviks, exists, neither in Paris nor in Istanbul.
The old Circassian emigrants of Syria and Palestine persistently want to return home, perhaps they have some kind of organization, but this has no actual connection with the activities of the new emigration.
Summarizing the entire material and the entire question based on the response of the Polish representative to two members of the committee M.D. and Kh.b., I conclude that the accusation was started by members of the committee, of whom one S.Sh. [Said Shamil], at least, gave his testimony in terms of the accusation. I very much regret that neither the persons accusing me nor the facts that could be taken into account are indicated.
The whole idea has the character of an unfounded intrigue, which I consider harmful and undesirable at this crucial moment in the Caucasian environment.
Kantemir”

Although there was no evidence to prove the allegations in line with the investigation of the suspects by the Polish counterintelligence (Ekspozytura II) and the statements of the suspects, there was a serious erosion of mutual trust. For example, in the report of the Polish secret service dated July 21, 1926, there was a note about Kantemir: «A dubious type of business with the Bolsheviks, a man to get rid of».[11] 
Although all his slanders and intrigues were understood to be unfounded, Said Shamil continued to fight not to lose the privileges of being the sole representative of the North Caucasian Political Emigration before the Polish Government and the opportunity to benefit from the financial funds the Polish provided to the Caucasian dissidents. In one of the letters he wrote to Tchenkeli on June 26, 1927, Said Shamil asked Tchenkeli to consider himself and his party, which he founded together with people mostly affiliated with the Monarchist Center of the Highlanders, as the sole representative of the North Caucasian political emigration. [12]

Said Shamil's letter to Akakiy Tchenkeli about the representation of North Caucasian Highlanders in the Caucasian Independence Committee
“Excellency,
For a long time, I have been waiting for the letter concerning our mutual interests that you promised me to write. The news received by Mr. Mdivani made me understand that the events in Paris impressed you.
Let's leave everything for the moment, but how, Excellency, could you excuse yourself for this negligence that you recorded for the official agreements prepared on your part, and decided jointly, in the different meetings of the Independence Committee, and ratified at the centers national.
You must not have forgotten, Excellency, the great meeting of the Georgian center chaired by the respectable Jordania, had recognized when I was in Paris, the collaboration of the Popular Party of Free Mountaineers of the Caucasus and you must remember Excellency, again the resolution of the Independence Committee, after notification of the projects prepared in Paris to recognize the Popular Party as the North Caucasian National Center until it is organized and to also recognize its right to participate in the affairs of the Committee, and to be represented in the Council of Three.
There is no doubt that like all the other decisions, this one too was ratified by the said centers!
After all these deliberations, would it not be a rather contemptuous step to want to remove the representatives of the Popular Party who also had the mandate of the Independence Committee?
It is, have no doubt, Excellency, an act, inconceivable to a sincere friendship that you must maintain towards our Party which aimed to establish a serious and fraternal collaboration between the Georgians and the Highlanders.
While waiting for reassuring movements from you and your colleagues against the misunderstanding, please, Excellency, accept my very distinguished greetings.
Shamil”

Cem Kumuk
Istanbul, 14 September 2023


To be Continued...
Next Part; Intrigues to monopolize the power...

[1] Archive of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia (AMIA), Tbilisi. (II), F. 13. Op. 3. D. 306. L. 13-15 (rev).
[2] Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN) w Warszawie. Attaches wojskowi 1918-1939, sygn. A II/33, k. 605-606.
[3] Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN) w Warszawie. Attaches wojskowi 1918-1939, sygn. A II/33, k. 625-628.
[4] Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN) w Warszawie. Attaches wojskowi 1918-1939,sygn. A II/33, k. 284-286.
[5] Nart [Ahmethan Miserbiev], Zhizn’ Mansura, Konstantinople, 1924 
[6] Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN) w Warszawie. Attaches wojskowi 1918-1939, sygn. A II/33, k. 629-647.
[7] «Sovershenno sekretno»: Lubyanka — Stalinu o polozhenii v strane (1922–1934 gg.). T. 2. M., 2001. S. 85–108
[8] Haydar Bammat Private Archive, From the representatives of the Caucasian Independence Committee to the members of the Council of Three, 04032-19260801_1 
[9] BDIC, Georgian Government Archives Microfilms, Protocols of the commission of the Caucasian Independence Committee assembled to investigate the case of Alihan Kantemir, 19. 8. 1926; 4. 9. 1926; 26. 2. 1927; 9. 3. 1927. mfm 881, reel 195. 
[10] Rossiyskiy gosudarstvennyy voyennyy arkhiv (RGVA). F. 461-k. Op. 1. D. 371. L. 1–4; D. 350. L. 1–7; D. 352. L. 1–5; D. 357. L. 1–3; D. 360. L. 1–24
[11] G. Targalski, « Les plans polonais concernant l’éclatement de l’URSS, le mouvement “Prométhée” et le Caucase”, Bulletin de l’Observatoire de l’Asie centrale et du Caucase, Paris, 1997, No. 3, p. 11.
[12] National Archives of Georgia, The First Democratic Republic of Georgia, F.1864, Inscription 2, Case 793, L.59-61